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FACILITATING SUCCESSFUL FAILURES
Michelle M. Harner*& Jamie Marincic Griffin†
Abstract
Approximately 80,000 businesses fail each year in the United States.
This Article presents an original empirical study that surveys more than
400 business restructuring professionals. The study focuses on a critical
factor that arguably contributes to these failures—the conduct of boards
of directors and management. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
management of distressed companies often bury their heads in the sand
until it is too late to remedy the companies’ problems, a phenomenon
commonly called “ostrich syndrome.” The data confirm this behavior,
shows a prevalent use of loss framing, and suggest trends consistent
with prospect theory. This Article draws on both the data and behavioral
economics to examine the genesis and contours of this problem. It then
discusses potential changes to applicable law and introduces a new
“meet and confer” process to encourage timely restructuring
negotiations. The meet and confer process is designed to promote
meaningful changes in management conduct and to facilitate more
“successful failures.” Policymakers should adopt regulations that foster
this mentality, rather than rewarding fear or ignorance in the face of
failure.
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Failure is simply the opportunity to begin again,
this time more intelligently.
-Henry Ford1
INTRODUCTION
Almost every company experiences financial distress at one point or
another in its life cycle. Small businesses frequently incur significant
losses for the first several years of operation, and many of those
companies never realize a profit.2 Companies that do eventually realize
1. Scott Allen, Henry Ford—Founder of Ford Motor Company and Assembly Line
Innovator,ABOUT.COM: ENTREPRENEURS, http://entrepreneurs.about.com/od/famousentrepreneu
rs/p/henryford.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
2. See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: ADVOCACY: THE
VOICE
OF
SMALL
BUSINESS
IN
GOVERNMENT,
available
at
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a profit often are, over time, unable to maintain those profits and
growth.3 Even the most mature companies face financial challenges.
Why then do some companies flourish despite (or perhaps because of)
these challenges, while others collapse under the pressure?
There likely is no single explanation, but one predominant factor is
company management. Playing on the words of James Carville during
the 1992 presidential race, “It’s the people, stupid.”4 The timing and
substance of management’s decisions in the face of financial uncertainty
are critical to the end result, regardless of what caused the distress in the
first instance. Yet, those outside of that decision-making process often
know relatively little about it, other than the loud criticism the public
voices upon a company’s failure or the frequently empty praise it sings
upon a company’s success.
This Article presents an in-depth analysis of the role that
management and boards of directors play in the resolution of
companies’ financial distress. It uses the results of an original empirical
survey of restructuring professionals along with behavioral economics
to evaluate management decisions and the role of federal bankruptcy
law in those decisions. Although every financial restructuring is unique
in one or more respects, the data show common themes that underlie
many cases and thus can guide policy reform in the insolvency context.
No one likes to admit failure.5 This adage is true for most people,
including boards of directors, chief executive officers, and other top
executives in corporate America. Understanding this adage can facilitate
an understanding of the choices management makes in the face of
financial distress. Indeed, the adage underlies the “ostrich syndrome”
that the corporate restructuring community frequently bemoans.6
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sbfaq.pdf (last updated Jan. 2011) (noting that while seven
out of ten small businesses survive their first two years of operations, only five out of ten
survive more than five years).
3. For a general description of business failures in the United States, see DUN & BRADSTREET,
U.S.
BUSINESS
TRENDS
QUARTERLY
REPORT
(2011),
available
D&B
at http://www.dnb.com/content/dam/english/economic-and-industry-insight/us_business_trends_2011
09.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (explaining the status of U.S. business failures currently estimated
at approximately 80,000 per year in 2010 and 2011, and providing historical data reflecting similar
&
BRADSTREET,
D&B
U.S. BUSINESS TRENDS
levels
of
failure);
DUN
REPORT (2011), available at http://www.dnb.com/content/dam/english/economic-and-industry-insight
/us_business_trends_201101.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
4. See, e.g., Bill Schneider, Analysis: Could It Be ‘The Economy, Stupid’ Again?, CNN
(Nov. 8, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/07/schneider.economy.poll/indexhtml.
5. See, e.g., Mark V. Pezzo & Stephanie P. Pezzo, Making Sense of Failure: A Motivated
Model of Hindsight Bias, 25 SOC. COGNITION 147, 148 (2007) (explaining, among other things,
two common responses to failure—“defensive processing” and “retroactive pessimism”—both
of which deny accountability).
6. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Discussing the “B” Word with Corporate Boards,
CREDIT SLIPS (June 17, 2010, 9:10 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/06/discussi
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Ostrich syndrome refers to management’s tendency to stick its
collective head in the sand and ignore the warning signs of financial
distress until it is too late to effectively resolve that distress.
Admittedly, the timing to initiate effective restructuring negotiations
is more art than science. It is a sensitive matter subject to many
contingencies and factors, some of which are beyond management’s
control. Nevertheless, a delay in restructuring discussions may place
management in a weaker negotiating position with key creditor
constituencies and allow short-term investors, whose interests may not
necessarily align with others, to amass large holdings in the company’s
capital structure. As a result, management may have fewer options once
it finally starts restructuring discussions.
Why is it difficult for individuals to admit either mistakes or failure,
and what can or should the law do about it? The vast literature on
behavioral economics offers some insight into the former,7 and the
growing body of literature studying behavioral economics in corporate
boardrooms has started to influence the latter.8 This Article further
ng-the-b-word-with-corporate-boards.html; John Tribe, Symptoms of Debtor Ostrich
Syndrome?, BANKR., INSOLVENCY & CORP. RESCUE (Apr. 10, 2009, 8:02 AM),
http://bankruptcyandinsolvency.blogspot.com/2009/04/symptoms-of-debtor-ostrich-syndrome
-r3s.html (explaining “that those with financial problems do not think they ‘need’ debt advice,
while those that do seek advice are not always going to the right places for it”). As an example,
former CEO of Circuit City Alan L. Wurtzel said, in an interview after the company’s
bankruptcy, that he wished the company had woken up sooner, but instead, “management
ushered in the new century with largely the same strategy” the company had developed during
1980, continuing to provide services customers no longer wanted. Rachel Feintzeig, Lessons
from the Death of Circuit City, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:47 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/10/25/lessons-from-the-death-of-circuit-city.
Wurtzel
commented, “It wasn’t obvious in sales and earnings, but the rot had set in.” Id.
7. “Behavioral Economics is the combination of psychology and economics that
investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display human limitations and
complications.” Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Abstract, Behavioral Economics
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7948, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7948.pdf; see also Craig Lambert, The Marketplace of
MAG.,
Mar.–Apr.
2006,
at
50,
available
at
Perceptions,
HARV.
http://harvardmag.com/pdf/2006/03-pdfs/0306-50.pdf (explaining development of behavioral
economics). But see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551–55 (1998) (criticizing behavioral economics).
8. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735,
1807–10 (2001); Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV. 509,
510–14 (2008); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1985, at 83, 83–84, 99–108; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 363–65 (2007); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry
into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate:
The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2–4 (2003) [hereinafter Dallas,
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develops this literature with its focus on heuristics (i.e., mental shortcuts
to facilitate quick decisions) and cognitive bias in the distressed
corporate boardroom. The representative heuristic, overconfidence and
optimism biases, and framing effects can impede management’s
decisions in distressed situations. Policymakers—as well as business
executives and professionals—must consider these behavioral traits
when they design and implement federal bankruptcy law.9
For example, restructuring professionals and commentators often
talk about filing for bankruptcy as a distressed company’s “option of
last resort.” They typically use this expression to underscore the need
for a distressed company to appreciate the significance of filing a
Chapter 11 reorganization case. Such a filing has broad and potentially
negative consequences and corporations should not undertake this
process lightly.10 The Chapter 11 process does, however, offer a
Psychology of Enron’s Demise]; Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance:
Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19, 73–79 (1988) [hereinafter Dallas,
Beyond Berle and Means]; Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power
and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583–85
(2002); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 812–13
(2001) [hereinafter Langevoort, Human Nature] (discussing the effect of personal relationships
on information sharing between managers and boards); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and
Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 107 (1997–1998) [hereinafter Langevoort,
Organized Illusions] (discussing managers’ various constituencies, motivations to lie, and why
regulations do not adequately deter misleading behavior); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the
Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception,
Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Corporate Thermostat]; Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate
Governance, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES 613, 614, 619 (2005); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board:
The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2003); Antony Page, Unconscious
Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 286–89. See generally
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1998) [hereinafter Langevoort,
Literature Review] (discussing the increasing acceptance of “[b]ehavioral economics” in
prominent economics and finance journals).
9. See, e.g., Hersh Shefrin, Behavioral Corporate Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall
2001, at 113, 113, 117–18 (providing examples of overconfidence leading to poor corporate
decision-making); Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism
Undermines Executives’ Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 56, 58 (examining cognitive
biases applicable to business decisions).
10. Although potential operational disruptions and reputational harm can be mitigated
with proper preparation, a company that files Chapter 11 may experience both. For example, the
automatic stay of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code often halts payments to vendors and trade
creditors (and sometimes even employees), and management must anticipate and address these
types of issues in order to maintain products and services at pre-bankruptcy quality and quantity
standards. Moreover, historically, bankruptcy suggested a lack of financial responsibility, and a
stigma attached to individuals and companies that sought bankruptcy protection. Several
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distressed company tools not otherwise available outside of bankruptcy,
and the utility of those tools frequently turns on the timing of the
bankruptcy filing.11 Accordingly, most restructuring professionals use
the term “last resort” loosely, not necessarily to mean “use only if all
else fails,” but to encourage careful deliberation of the matter.12
But is that what a distressed company’s management hears? The
term “last resort” typically means “you do it because you can find no
other way of getting out of a difficult situation or of solving a
problem.”13 Thus, the phrase “filing bankruptcy should be your option
of last resort” may mean one thing to the restructuring professional and
something completely different to a business executive not trained in
bankruptcy parlance. It also might enable any heuristics and cognitive
biases management harbors and confirm management’s entrenched
views regarding any bankruptcy filing or the potential success of its
existing business plan.14
We conducted an extensive empirical survey of business
restructuring professionals to test a basic hypothesis they developed
through anecdotal evidence: Management of distressed companies often
deny the extent of their companies’ distress and delay discussions of a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. Over 400 restructuring professionals
responded to the empirical survey (the Management Behavior Study).
The survey data confirm the basic hypothesis and show some troubling
trends. For example, the overwhelming majority of respondents use the
phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort” with distressed clients.15 Moreover,
respondents who never used the phrase were significantly more likely to
commentators and anecdotal evidence suggest that this stigma no longer exists, but it also is a
factor that companies must consider. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance
and Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703,
729 & n.150 (2008).
11. Such tools include the debtor’s ability to decide unilaterally (for the most part) to
assume or reject contracts and leases, to obtain financing that primes existing liens (thus
providing a source of capital not available outside of bankruptcy), to sell some or all of its assets
free and clear of all liens and claims, and to delay the payment of and restructure its prepetition
obligations while continuing to operate the business. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 (the automatic
stay), 363 (asset sales), 364 (financing), 365 (contracts and leases), 1129 (plan confirmation
provisions) (2006).
12. See infra Subsection II.C.2.
13. COLLINS COBUILD ENGLISH DICTIONARY FOR ADVANCED LEARNER’S ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2003).
14. For example, a framing bias may alter what management hears and in turn bolster any
confirmation or overconfidence bias influencing management’s decisions. “[F]raming bias is the
tendency to view a given problem in different terms depending on the perspective from which
the problem is viewed.” Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in
Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 796–97 (2003) (describing the cognitive bias
known as framing or anchoring).
15. See infra Subsection II.C.2.
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have a client who initially refused, but ultimately did, file a bankruptcy
case.16 That data may suggest those clients successfully restructure
outside of the bankruptcy process or, more troubling, signal prospect
theory at work: Professionals use a loss frame to discuss bankruptcy,
and distressed clients pursue riskier out-of-court solutions that at best
provide only short-term solutions.
Better understanding management’s decisions in the face of a
company’s distress can lead to better policies and outcomes. This
Article makes original and meaningful contributions to this dialogue.
Part I provides relevant background information about the restructuring
alternatives for distressed companies as well as the heuristics and biases
that potentially impact decision-making in this context. Part II then
presents original empirical data and examines the data in light of the
behavioral economics literature and prior studies. Part III uses these
analyses to evaluate the existing restructuring landscape and suggests
legislative reforms to mitigate the negative effects of heuristics in the
distressed company context. These reforms include a revamp of the
hybrid restructuring options for distressed companies that provides
incentives and stronger legislative support for companies that begin
restructuring discussions in a timely manner.17 This Article concludes
by encouraging policymakers, professionals, and business executives to
further consider how heuristics might impede successful reorganizations
and to integrate countermeasures into both bankruptcy legislation and
strategy discussions to foster more successful failures.
I. FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING
Companies experience distress for a variety of reasons, both
systemic and idiosyncratic.18 Systemic risk refers to factors that affect
16. See infra Subsection II.C.4; cf. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268–69 (1979) (discussing how
individuals are more likely to take risks when they face two negative prospects).
17. See infra Subsection III.B.1 (discussing the new concept of “meet and confer”
process, or an MCP, that provides a more effective quasi-judicial option for distressed
companies).
18. See, e.g., Dean Anderson & Elliot A. Fuhr, Diagnosing Distressed Companies: A
Practical Example, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 1994, at 9, 9 tbl.1 (“Major Warning Signs of
Financial Distress: Declining Net Income; Decreasing or Inadequate Margins; Creditors
Unwilling to Advance Credit; Loss of a Major Supplier with Special Credit Terms; Reduction in
Lines of Credit; Excessive Receivables over 90 Days; Default on Payment by a Major
Customer; Excessive Payables Unpaid over 90 Days; Inability to Make Timely Deposits of
Trust Funds such as Employee Withholding Taxes; Inability to Service Long-Term Debt
Requirements; Excessive Re-negotiation of Broken Loan Covenants; Unusual or Extraordinary
Litigation and Events Not Customarily Encountered in the Industry; Loss of Key Financial
Officers or Key Personnel; Cash Management Becoming a Primary Activity at the Expense of
Traditional Management Functions; New Long-Term Financing Proceeds Applied to Pay Off
Debts Rather Than Acquisition of Assets; Poor Record Keeping or Inadequate Financial
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entire industries or markets and are not unique to a particular
company.19 The economic turmoil and resulting recession in 2008
highlighted the global instability that systemic risk can trigger.
Idiosyncratic risk refers to internal factors often specific to a particular
company, such as its business lines, capital structure, or management
activity or inactivity.20 Moreover, systemic risk can accelerate
idiosyncratic risk and compound a company’s distress and restructuring
efforts.
Notably, when a company undertakes either an in- or out-of-court
restructuring, management focuses on the systemic and external factors
that cause the company’s distress. Press releases frequently tout a weak
economy and softening customer demand as key drivers behind a
company’s decision to file a Chapter 11 case.21 Management rarely
identify idiosyncratic factors or risks that either their own decisions or
their strategic objectives cause.
Management’s reluctance to acknowledge responsibility for a
company’s distress may be a natural human response, given individuals’
Records; Lack of Basic Controls, such as Perpetual Inventory Record Keeping; Significant
Discrepancies Between Actual and Projected Results over the Prior Three Years.”). The
company Dun & Bradstreet uses several of these indicators to provide credit scores and supplier
D&B,
evaluation
risk
summaries
for
businesses.
Instructional
Guide,
https://www.dnb.com/sassmo/help/InstructionalGuide.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
19. One commentator notes:
A common factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger
event, such as an economic shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of bad
economic consequences—sometimes referred to as a domino effect. These
consequences could include (a chain of) financial institution and/or market
failures. Less dramatically, these consequences might include (a chain of)
significant losses to financial institutions or substantial financial-market price
volatility. In either case, the consequences impact financial institutions,
markets, or both.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008).
20. See, e.g., Robert Ackerman & Elizabeth Chorvat, Modern Financial Theory and
Transfer Pricing, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 671 (2002) (discussing one way idiosyncratic
risk can work in practice by comparing inventory assets in the hands of a distributor as opposed
to a local retailer); James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 1187, 1189 n.2 (2007) (“‘Idiosyncratic,’ ‘unique,’ ‘firm-specific,’ or ‘diversifiable’ risk
is risk that is particular to that specific firm.”).
21. Affidavit of Richard Golden in Support of First Day Motions and Applications at ¶ 15,
In re UFood Restaurant Grp., No. 12-19702 (Bankr. D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2012) (“[D]ue to
economic downturn, the Debtors’ slow recovery there from, and certain other factors, certain of
the company-owned UFood Outlets are struggling and are a drag on the Debtors’ businesses.”);
Affidavit of Antoinette P. McCorvey at ¶ 10, In re Easte Kodak Company, No. 12-10202
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) (“Since 2008, despite Kodak’s best efforts, restructuring costs
and recessionary forces have continued to negatively impact the Company’s liquidity
position . . . .”).
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general reluctance to take ownership of their mistakes.22 Heuristics may
reinforce this reaction. Several studies explore the impact on CEO and
board decisions of confirmation and overconfidence biases.23 These
potential management flaws can prove fatal to a distressed company.
They may skew management’s perception of the company’s financial
health and may delay necessary operational and restructuring activities.
How a distressed company’s professionals frame and discuss with
management the company’s restructuring alternatives may further
enable these biases.
This Part explains the basic legal and behavioral economics
arguments pertinent to an analysis of management decision-making in
the distressed company context. It first outlines the restructuring
alternatives for a distressed company by summarizing the in- and outof-court options likely available to a distressed company. It then
considers behavioral economics literature and its relevance to corporate
boardrooms.
A. Restructuring Alternatives
A troubled company may experience financial distress, economic
distress, or both. Financial distress generally refers to the financial
condition of the company, including its leverage, financial obligations
to creditors, and ability to meet those obligations.24 Economic distress,
on the other hand, refers to weaknesses in the company’s business
model and operations.25 Although economic distress can lead to
financial distress, the reverse progression can also occur, and cause the
untimely demise of a profitable business model. In both cases, the

22. See, e.g., Eugene Szwajkowski, Accounting for Organizational Misconduct, 11 J. BUS.
ETHICS 401, 402 (1992) (describing the literature on the failure-to-take-responsibility
phenomenon and noting how the discovery of organizational misconduct creates a predicament
for a manager because the event may “cast[] undesired aspersions on the lineage, character,
conduct, skills, or motives” of the manager, which may damage the individual’s social and
professional standing).
23. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 8, at 531; Cunningham, supra note 8, at 350–51; Dallas,
Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 8, at 37; Dallas, Beyond Berle and Means, supra
note 8, at 98–99; Greenfield, supra note 8, at 586; Langevoort, Human Nature, supra note 8, at
812–13; Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 8, 139–142; Langevoort, Corporate
Thermostat, supra note 8, at 299–302; Marnet, supra note 8, at 613–14; Page, supra note 8, at
265–66.
24. Lemma W. Senbet & Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Financial Distress and
Bankruptcy: A Survey, 5 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN FIN. 243 (2012) (manuscript at 7),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2034646.
25. Id.; see also Michael L. Lemmon, Yung-Yu Ma & Elizabeth Tashjian, Restructuring
and Post Emergence Performance of Bankrupt Firms: Evidence from the Post-1991 Period 10,
12–13 (Apr. 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Lower operating
performance is associated with a greater degree of economic distress . . . .”).
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substance and timing of management’s decisions are critical to the
company’s ultimate success.26
What constitutes success in the restructuring context is subject to
debate. Some commentators focus on maximizing the business’s value
while others emphasize rehabilitating the business and preserving jobs
and economic development.27 An optimal restructuring strikes a balance
between these competing goals and facilitates the reorganization of
economically viable firms. Economic viability may result from
deleveraging and, in some cases, revamping the business model.28
Again, both outcomes largely depend on management’s restructuring
path.
Most commentators agree that management should pursue out-ofcourt restructuring options before filing for bankruptcy.29 Bankruptcy
26. See Lemma W. Senbet & James K. Seward, Financial Distress, Bankruptcy and
Reorganization, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 921,
951–53 (R.A. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995) (discussing how managerial ability and decision-making
are important determinants of firm value both generally and when the firm is in distress).
27. See In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that
value maximization should be the goal of Chapter 11); Hon. Leif M. Clark et al., What
Constitutes Success in Chapter 11? A Roundtable Discussion, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229,
229–33 (1994) (discussing how a Chapter 11 case that provides workers with time to find new
jobs is more successful than a Chapter 7 case with immediate job termination); James H.M.
Sprayregen et al., Chapter 11: Not Perfect, but Better than the Alternatives, 14 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 6 art. 1 (2005) (noting two perspectives among Chapter 11 scholars, the
“rehabilitationists” who view the rehabilitative aspects of Chapter 11 as valuable and those who
think the current process is not useful).
28. See Lemmon, supra note 25, at 10, 12 (noting that firms classified as financially
distressed are primarily distressed by high leverage but have “fundamentally sound business
models”, whereas firms classified as economically distressed are characterized by “a business
model with fundamental problems” and operating performance is the dominant source of
distress); FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, BANKRUPTCY & RESTRUCTURING COMPENDIUM 2012, at 152
(document on file with the Florida Law Review) (discussing large-scale bank deleveraging); id.
at 60 (discussing business model changes in the airline industry).
29. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, First Report of the Select Advisory Committee on
Business Reorganization, 57 BUS. LAW. 163, 179 (2001); Hon. Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-ofCourt Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 347, 365 (1993) (noting that out-of-court
workouts, when successful, are typically more beneficial to all parties than when a company
utilizes the bankruptcy courts); Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John & Larry H.P. Lang, Troubled Debt
Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganizations of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 315, 319 (1990); see also Randolph J. Haines, Bankrupting the Opposition, 21 LITIG.,
Summer 1995, at 38, 40 (“Out-of-court workouts, even if they mean accepting pennies on the
dollar, are usually quicker and cheaper than any bankruptcy, and therefore likely to return more
to creditors. Moreover, the out-of-court workout probably stands a greater chance of permitting
the debtor to remain in business, and thus be a valuable customer in the future.”); Bettina M.
Whyte & Patricia D. Tilton, Turnarounds: Pursuing a Dual Path, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov.
1995, at 28, 28 (“Generally speaking . . . an out-of-court workout is preferable to reorganizing
under the Code due to the cost, image, drain or resources, impact on morale, etc. of a
bankruptcy.”).
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can be a lengthy and expensive process.30 Nevertheless, each option
deserves independent consideration because each has particular
advantages that depend on the company’s circumstances. To maximize
the utility of any option, management must understand and remain open
to all restructuring options. As described below, the prospects of a
Chapter 11 case might encourage an out-of-court restructuring or
streamline the bankruptcy process through a prepackaged bankruptcy
case.31
1. Out-of-Court Restructurings
An out-of-court restructuring typically involves a consensual
agreement between the company and its major creditors to adjust the
company’s capital structure. It also may accompany or facilitate an
operational restructuring. The key attributes of most successful out-ofcourt restructurings include a concentrated creditor group and a good
working relationship between the company and its creditors, vendors,
and suppliers. Although simple in concept, a private, consensual
resolution can prove challenging to achieve because even one dissenting
creditor can often derail the entire restructuring.
The dissenting or “holdout” creditor’s power stems largely from
provisions in both a company’s prepetition debt instruments and the
Indenture Trust Act of 1939. For example, a credit facility or indenture
might require a supermajority or unanimous voting threshold in order to
waive certain defaults, request forbearance, or take other necessary
actions to achieve the desired restructuring.32 Likewise, the Indenture
Trust Act of 1939 provides that an indenture may not affect an
individual bondholder’s right to receive the “payment of the principal of
and interest . . . on or after the respective due dates . . . or to institute
suit for the enforcement of any such payment” without the consent of
30. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 29, at 183–84 (noting that the many expenses
associated with bankruptcy restructuring—filing fees, costs associated with compliance and
reporting requirements, attorney’s fees, and costs associated with appearing in court—can be
excessive); see also Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market
Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295, 299 (1989) (arguing that
“the process of reorganization, especially if protracted, can destroy value”); Charles J. Tabb,
The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 799–800 (1993) (discussing multiple studies
regarding the large costs of Chapter 11).
31. See W. HOMER DRAKE JR. & CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND, CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATIONS § 12:3 (2d ed. 2011) (providing a general overview of how prepackaged
plans work generally); Gebbia-Pinetta, supra note 29, at 184 (“[B]oth the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission and the National Bankruptcy Conference have formally recommended that
efforts be made to reduce unnecessary costs and delay in Chapter 11 restructurings by
facilitating and expediting pre-packaged Chapter 11 reorganization cases.”).
32. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 250–51
(1987) (discussing the legislative history of the Act and noting that both Congress and the SEC
knew that this holdout problem could frustrate some out-of-court workouts).
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the bondholder.33 Accordingly, an individual creditor may have
significant influence over the extent and success of a company’s out-ofcourt restructuring efforts.
An out-of-court restructuring may take a variety of forms. A
company may attempt to exchange its existing debt for either new notes
with more favorable repayment terms or common stock in order to
reduce the company’s overall leverage.34 It may engage in a program of
asset disposal within the bounds of debt covenants. It may seek a
strategic partner with some financing backing. It may also use a
combination of these and other recapitalization options, which include
the infusion of new capital or new investors into the capital structure.35
Such restructurings are not, however, free from cost. The company
likely must pay significant fees, and the restructuring may require
concessions regarding operations and any future restructurings.
Concessions in the face of an out-of-court restructuring may
appropriately discipline management or, alternatively, unduly impede
management’s ability to return a company to profitability. For example,
management’s agreement to sell non-core assets or retain a Chief
Restructuring Officer might help rightsize a business. The Chief
Restructuring Officer may, however, have obligations to the creditors
and encourage a company to forego projects that do not align with the
creditors’ investment horizons or the interests of other constituents.36
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa, 77ppp(b) (2006); see also George W. Shuster, Jr., The Trust
Indenture Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431, 436–37
(2006) (discussing how 316(b) “provides contractually preemptive protection” “to one
bondholder against other bondholders” “for payment of principal and interest when due”).
34. See, e.g., Saybrook Successfully Completes the Out-of Court Restructuring of Foster
Wheeler, Ltd., BUSINESSWIRE (Nov. 4, 2004, 6:05 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20041104005211/en/Saybrook-Successfully-Completes-Out-of-Court-Restructuring
-Foster-Wheeler; Jennifer Weitzman, J. Crew Downgraded by Standard & Poor’s, WOMEN’S
WEAR DAILY (Apr. 15, 2003), http://www.wwd.com/fashion-news/fashion-features/j-crewdowngraded-by-standard-poor-8217-s-734165 (subscription required); Continental Global
Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 23, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/24008/000095015204005565/l08789ae8vk.txt; see also
Gina Gutzeit & John Yozzo, Distressed Debt Exchanges: You Can Run, but You Can’t Hide,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2010, at 46, 46 (discussing how distressed debt exchanges, where a
troubled borrower offers a creditor different securities in exchange for the debt claim, increased
dramatically in 2009). See generally Edward I. Altman & Brenda Karlin, The Re-Emergence of
Distressed Exchanges in Corporate Restructuring, 5 J. CREDIT RISK, Summer 2009, at 43,
available at http://www.risk.net/digital_assets/4519/v5n2a3.pdf (discussing the re-emergence of
distressed exchange as a restructuring mechanism).
35. See, e.g., Dan Trigoboff, XM Radio Gets $450M Infusion, BROADCASTING & CABLE
(Dec. 29, 2002), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/145257-XM_Radio_Gets_ 450M
_Infusion.php.
36. See John Wm. Butler, Jr., Chris L. Dickerson & Stephen S. Neuman, Preserving State
Corporate Governance Law in Chapter 11: Maximizing Value Through Traditional Fiduciaries,
18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 337, 356 (2010) (noting that while some experts believe
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Similarly, restrictive covenants and creditor veto rights in the
restructuring documents may hinder future operations.37 For these
reasons, management must tread carefully through the out-of-court
restructuring negotiations.
In this vein, management’s openness to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
process might hold value in restructuring discussions. Management’s
ability to explain creditors’ rights in, and the landscape of, any Chapter
11 case for the company allows all parties to appreciate the choices at
hand and may provide management with leverage in negotiations.38
Nevertheless, this approach also requires management to confront both
its own failings and the possibility that management might have to air
those failings in a very public forum—a thought often repugnant to
management. Consequently, the Chapter 11 option often enters the
discussion, if at all, too late in the process.
2. Bankruptcy Restructurings
A distressed company may file a Chapter 7 liquidation case or a
Chapter 11 reorganization case under the Bankruptcy Code. In a
Chapter 7 case, a bankruptcy trustee replaces the company’s
management and works to sell the company’s assets to repay its
creditors.39 In a Chapter 11 case, the company’s management generally
stays in control of the company and its reorganization efforts;40 the
company operates as a “debtor-in-possession” with essentially the same
independent, third-party chief restructuring officers can prove beneficial, the use of CROs raises
serious conflict of interest issues because CROs can be “predisposed to favor only one entity
involved in the debtor’s chapter 11 reorganization: the creditor who was responsible for getting
them hired”).
37. See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization
Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 153, 198 (2004) (discussing the expanding power of secured creditors in the
Chapter 11 process, which is due in part to credit facillities’ use of restrictive covenants and
rights of control provisions); Martin J. Whitman, Stanley J. Garstka & Myron M. Sheinfeld, A
Rejoinder to “The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,” 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 839, 856–57 (1993)
(discussing restrictive covenants such as cash sweeps and prohibitions on future borrowing that
can impair the reorganization process).
38. See, e.g., John C. DiDonato & Daniel P. Wikel, Managing Traditional Chapter 11
Reorganizations: A Primer for Directors and Officers on Bankruptcy Fundamentals, in
NAVIGATING TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT: THE DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ GUIDE TO
RESTRUCTURING 214, 214 (John Wm. Butler, Jr. ed., 2010) (“Sometimes the best weapon, and
strongest negotiation tactic with creditor constituents, is to play the ‘bankruptcy card’. Most
parties are aware that filing for protection affords companies ‘time out’ from their creditors and
the precious time to regroup.”).
39. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–727 (2006) (showing general Chapter 7 provisions of
Bankruptcy Code); id. §§ 701–704 (discussing the selection of a trustee and duties of a trustee).
40. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1146 (2006) (showing general Chapter 11
provisions of Bankruptcy Code).
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rights, duties, and powers as a bankruptcy trustee.41 A company can sell
some or all of its assets in a Chapter 11 case,42 and creditors can request
the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee or examiner.43 Notably, the
actual appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is the exception rather than
the rule.44
Not surprisingly, when bankruptcy is necessary, most companies
prefer to file Chapter 11 cases. As noted above, in Chapter 11 cases the
company—through its management—stays in control of the process and
continues to operate its business. In addition, the Bankruptcy Code
offers management a number of useful restructuring tools. For example,
the bankruptcy filing triggers an automatic stay, which prevents parties
from prepetition actions and the collection of prepetition debts against
the company. The debtor retains the unilateral ability to decide whether
to keep or reject most types of contracts and leases, and has a significant
period of time to make this decision. The debtor may sell some or all of
its assets free and clear of most claims, liens, and encumbrances. It also
has an initial exclusive period to file a proposed plan of reorganization.
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor assistance in the
negotiation and structure of post-petition financing.
Nevertheless, management of a distressed company may have
operational and reputational concerns that relate to a Chapter 11 filing.
Although some originally characterized the amendments as creating a
pro-debtor forum,45 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code reallocate
41. Id. § 1107 (discussing the rights, powers, and duties of a company as a debtor-inpossession).
42. Id. § 363 (permitting sales of a debtor’s assets in the ordinary course of business or,
with prior notice and approval, outside of the ordinary course of business); see also Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 673–74 (2003)
(discussing how the asset sales in Chapter 11 today are inconsistent with past conceptions of
bankruptcy reorganization); Ali M.M. Mojdehi & Janet Dean Gertz, The Implicit “Good Faith”
Requirement in Chapter 11 Liquidations: A Rule in Search of a Rationale?, 14 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 143, 152–53 (2006) (discussing history, scholarship, and case law in regard to
companies using Chapter 11 to liquidate and sell assets rather than to reorganize and re-emerge).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (discussing appointment of a trustee or examiner); see also Kelli A.
Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 83, 83 (2007)
(commenting that the “conventional wisdom . . . that Chapter 11 trustees should almost never be
appointed . . . is wrong”); Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in
Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1012 (1994)
(discussing creditors threatening to petition the court to appoint a trustee if managers do not
resign); Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2010) (defining the role
of examiners and Congress’s reasoning for creating them).
44. See Alces, supra note 43, at 84 (noting that companies rarely pursue the appointment
of a trustee in bankruptcy); Lipson, supra note 43, at 50 (noting that while examiners are more
likely to appear in larger cases, they are still rare—even among larger cases).
45. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 1), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 101 (1983) (noting that
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power in many Chapter 11 cases to allow prepetition lenders, landlords,
counterparties, and other constituencies to significantly influence the
process.46 For example, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) shortened a debtor’s exclusive period
to file a reorganization plan and limited the types of retention and
severance benefits available to a debtor’s top management.47 BAPCPA
also truncated the debtor’s time to assume or reject commercial real estate
leases and elevated the priority of a vendor’s reclamation claims against
the debtor.48 In addition, various amendments broaden the protections
afforded counterparties under certain types of derivatives and financial
contracts with a debtor, all of which potentially cause a debtor to lose
significant value on the first day of a bankruptcy case.49
The constant power struggle with Chapter 11—played out in
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and in bankruptcy courts
throughout the United States—is counterproductive to the common
goals of the debtor and all of its constituencies, i.e., maximization of
value and rehabilitation of viable businesses. Neither a pro-debtor nor a
pro-creditor system achieves an optimal result.50 As such, the current
debtor companies were generally “successful in dictating the terms of reorganization to their
creditors”); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 247–48 (1983) (noting that creditors
historically took little interest in bankruptcy proceedings because the bankruptcy legislation did
not “provide the means for them to exercise meaningful control or to make their participation
profitable”). See generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW IN AMERICA 212–32 (2001) (explaining historical aspects of the perception that bankruptcy
laws favored debtors).
46. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 42, at 675 (describing creditor control as the
dominant theme in modern Chapter 11 cases).
47. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1098, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); see 11 U.S.C.
§§ 503(c), 1121(d) (2006).
48. See Robert N.H. Christmas, Designation Rights—A New, Post-BAPCPA World, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2006, at 10, 10 (noting the new timing limitation will dramatically affect
debtors); David L. Woods, Reclamation Under BAPCPA: Model for Uniformity?, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., July/Aug. 2007, at 40, 40 (discussing how the BAPCPA provisions expanded the ability
of a seller to reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer).
49. Rhett G. Campbell, Financial Markets Contracts and BAPCPA, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
697, 712 (2005) (describing how Congress concluded “that expanded [protections for
counterparties, etc] will promote the stability of worldwide capital markets and that this public
good (reducing systemic risk) justifies preserving less value for creditors in a single bankruptcy
proceeding”); Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New
Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 641 (2005) (discussing amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, which
“now protect[] any counterparty to any derivatives contract”); Michael H. Weiss, Using
Derivatives to Create Bankruptcy Proof Loans, 30 CAL. BANKR. J. 207, 268 (2010) (describing
how BAPCPA effectively removes large numbers of transactions from the bankruptcy process,
which is historically designed to treat creditors in an orderly and fair manner).
50. See, e.g., 1 BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS: NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW
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power balance that arguably favors various creditor constituencies often
causes distressed companies to either forego Chapter 11 or delay any
Chapter 11 filing to their detriment. Anecdotal and empirical data
suggest that management fears loss of control and loss of valuable
contract rights.51
A distressed company’s management also may fear losing face.
Once a company files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it basically operates
inside a public fishbowl.52 The company must disclose extensive
information that concerns its prepetition and current operations and
obligations. Various parties, which include a statutory committee of
unsecured creditors, have rights to review and investigate management
activities.53 Empirical studies also document a high turnover in top
management of bankrupt companies, which may cause some managers
to worry about job security if they discuss bankruptcy options.54
Moreover, bankruptcy often carries the stigma of failure and is a very
public recognition of a management’s deficiencies.55
On balance, in the current legislative environment, management of a
distressed company may be reluctant to consider bankruptcy as a viable
restructuring option. If management ignores this option, however, outCOMMISSION FINAL REPORT, at i (1997) (“A bankruptcy system that does not balance the
interests of creditors and the interests of debtors will have neither their confidence nor, of even
greater importance, the confidence of the American people.”).
51. See infra Part II; see also A. Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11: A
Reply to Professor Baird, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 109, 133–34 (2004) (discussing how
managers of insolvent or nearly insolvent firms make biased decisions and also experience fear
that they are about to lose their job).
52. Brad B. Erens & Kelly M. Neff, Confidentiality in Chapter 11, 22 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 47, 48 (2005) (describing how bankruptcy court filings are publicly available and how
displaying proceedings in a public forum often is not in the best interest of the company or its
creditors).
53. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 2015(a)(1)–(5) (providing that the debtor-in-possession
(DIP) or trustee must: file and transmit a report containing a complete inventory of the property
of the debtor; “keep a record of receipts and the disposition of money and property received”;
file reports and summaries statutorily required, which must include additional information if
payments are made to employees; and provide quarterly reports that regard any disbursements
and any fees payable for that quarter); id. 2015.3(a) (providing that the DIP or trustee must “file
periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a
publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a
substantial or controlling interest”); 11 U.S.C. § 308 (2006) (discussing the reporting
requirements applicable to small business cases).
54. See Dickerson, supra note 51, at 132 n.110, 134; see also Ramesh K.S. Rao, David
Simon Sokolow & Derek White, Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on
Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53, 67 (1996) (citing to
empirical studies by Stuart Gilson, Lynn LoPucki, and their colleagues, regarding high turnover
amongst management and directors prior to and during bankruptcy).
55. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 51, at 134 (noting that directors of insolvent firms
take into account the anticipated reputational harm and public scrutiny they may face if or when
the company files for bankruptcy).
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of-court restructurings may weaken management’s position and inhibit
hybrid restructuring efforts, such as a prepackaged plan of
reorganization.56 A company must be willing to consider bankruptcy,
however, in order to assess the utility of any hybrid restructuring plan.
3. Prepackaged Restructurings
A prepackaged plan of reorganization, which is similar to most
hybrid restructuring tools, typically involves a private restructuring
arrangement the company implements through a judicial process.57 It
has the potential to mitigate some of the concerns critics frequently
voice about a full-blown Chapter 11 case.58 It is not a restructuring
option, however, for every distressed company, and its current structure
confines the types of distress the process successfully resolves.
For the most part, non-bankruptcy law governs prepackaged plans
that represent a privately negotiated contract solution to a company’s
distress.59 This aspect of the process subjects it to several of the
limitations discussed above in the context of pure out-of-court
workouts. For example, the company does not receive the benefit of an
automatic stay, and it may find it difficult to identify and bring to the
negotiating table the necessary parties.60 Prepackaged plans also usually
apply only to the resolution of bank and funded debt claims because of
both collective action problems and challenges from representing
unsecured creditors, vendors, employees, and shareholders at the
negotiating table.61 This may expose the company to ongoing
vulnerability, either because of the company’s failure to truly
deleverage the balance sheet or because of the new burdens the only
constituencies at the table—typically banks and bondholders—
impose.62
56. JOSE M. GARRIDO, A WORLD BANK STUDY: OUT-OF-COURT DEBT RESTRUCTURING 48–
49 (2012).
57. Id. at 49.
58. See Duberstein, supra note 29, at 365 (1993) (“Since the prepackaged plan is
negotiated before the [C]hapter 11 case starts, it can take advantage of all the benefits available
under the Code without the detriments of a prolonged and expensive proceeding . . . .”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Marc S. Kirschner et al., Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans: The
Deleveraging Tool of the ’90s in the Wake of OID and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. REV.
643, 663 (1991))).
59. Harner, supra note 10, at 739.
60. See id. at 737–39 (“The consensual nature of an out-of-court restructuring limits its
usefulness.”).
61. Id. at 739.
62. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54
VAND. L. REV. 231, 252 (2001) (“[C]ompanies emerging from prepackaged bankruptcies after
1990 were more likely to refile than were companies emerging from non-prepackaged cases
during the same period.”).
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In a pure prepackaged plan scenario, the company solicits
acceptances of the proposed plan from the debtholders whose claims the
plan modifies. This solicitation must comply with applicable nonbankruptcy law, which includes federal securities law, for any public
securities the plan involves.63 If the debtholder’s acceptance of the plan
comports with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, the company
then commences a Chapter 11 case to confirm and implement the
prepackaged plan.64 This can be a relatively quick process.65 If the
company does not receive acceptable support for the plan, it can start
the process over or commence its Chapter 11 case as a prearranged plan
case. In the prearranged plan scenario, the company may refine the
prepetition plan and solicit acceptances of the plan again through the
formal solicitation and confirmation procedures under the Bankruptcy
Code.66
Both prepackaged and prearranged plans are alternatives to a long,
contentious bankruptcy case, but they are only two of a distressed
company’s options and, as currently structured, provide only limited
relief. Moreover, if a company is unwilling to discuss bankruptcyrelated tools, it may discount or ignore any hybrid restructuring options.
The challenge, then, is to foster with management a meaningful
dialogue that concerns the company’s distress and that accounts for all
of its restructuring options at a time that still permits full exploitation of
those options. The next section of this Article discusses the heuristics
and cognitive biases that can potentially confound this discussion.
B. Heuristics and Bias in Decision-Making
Business decisions are complex, time-sensitive, and, in the distressed
context, almost always subject to controversy.67 Even the most skilled
63. Harner, supra note 10, at 739.
64. Id. at 739–40.
65. According to BankruptcyData.com, one of the quickest prenegotiated or prepackaged
bankruptcies since 2009 was for Baseline Oil & Gas Corp, which was filed August 28, 2009 and
was confirmed twenty-eight days later. Douglas M. Foley & James E. Van Horn, Prepacks on
the Rise in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: Prenegotiated Plans Can Accelerate Reorganization,
TURNAROUND MGMT. ASS’N (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.
aspx?objectID=9655; see also In re Baseline Oil & Gas Corp., No. 09-36291, 2009 Bankr.
LEXIS 5453, at *1–2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2009).
66. Harner, supra note 10, at 740–41.
67. See GPC XLI, L.L.C. v. Loral Space & Commc’ns, Inc., Nos. 2808-VCS, 3022-VCS,
2008 WL 4293781, at *1–2, *4, *12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (involving a group of minority
shareholders who, after the company emerged from Chapter 11, brought a derivative action on
behalf of the corporation against the dominant shareholder (a company “whose business model
involved taking control of distressed companies and positioning itself to reap the benefits of
control for itself and its investors”) and its directors and alleged unfairness in connection with a
complex post-bankruptcy financing transaction); see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
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executives need input and support to make these decisions. Many
executives find this support in their colleagues and professional
advisers.68 The value of that support to the company, however, may turn
on the decision maker’s own heuristics and cognitive biases.69
1. Examples of Heuristics and Biases
Heuristics are mental shortcuts individuals use to facilitate quick and
decisive action, often at the expense of ignoring relevant information.70
These shortcuts—also referred to as “decision-making strategies”—rely
on factors easily accessible by the decision-maker, such as prior
experiences (e.g., representative heuristics) and emotions (e.g.,
confirmation, overconfidence, and loss-aversion biases).71 Corporate
managers may invoke any number of these mental strategies to respond
with the speed and efficacy that stakeholders and markets demand.72 A
1209, 1236–37 (2006); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 918 (2003). See generally Loral
Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Loral Space & Commc’ns, Ltd., 342 B.R. 132 (S.D.N.Y.
2006). When a company experiences financial distress, a number of different constituencies,
which include lenders, may place pressure on management. Moreover, at least one commentator
suggests that this pressure and influence exists even outside of the distressed context. See
Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in
Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 120 (2009) (“Lender influence is pervasive.
Empirical research documents the regularity with which banks constrain fundamental
managerial decisions even in the ordinary course of business.”).
68. See, e.g., CORP. LAWS COMM., ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, Corporate Director’s
Guidebook—Sixth Edition, 66 BUS. LAW. 975, 989 (2011) (discussing the board’s options for
staying informed and finding support).
69. For a general discussion of heuristics and biases, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 59–208 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Inga Chira, Michael Adams & Barry
Thornton, Behavioral Bias Within the Decision Making Process, 6 J. BUS. & ECON. RES., Aug.
2008, at 11, 11 (“[Behavioral finance] draws on the psychology and cognitive science literatures
to examine why individual decision-making often deviates from rational choices in systematic
ways.”); Langevoort, Literature Review, supra note 8, at 1501–02. See generally Roger G. Noll
& James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 747 (1990) (discussing the implications of cognitive psychology in high-risk decisionmaking).
70. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Making, 62 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 451, 454 (2011) (“A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information,
with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex
methods.”).
71. See Eyal Ert & Ido Erev, The Rejection of Attractive Gambles, Loss Aversion, and the
Lemon Avoidance Heuristic, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 715, 721 (2008) (discussing loss aversion
bias in heuristic decision-making); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
751, 766 (2003) (discussing the use of prior experience in heuristic decision-making); Larissa Z.
Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of
Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973, 973
(2001) (discussing emotions and moods in heuristic decision-making).
72. Jaana Woiceshyn, Lessons from “Good Minds”: How CEOs Use Intuition, Analysis
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few strategies are particularly relevant in the context of distressed
companies.
The representative heuristic refers to individuals who draw upon past
experiences and “perceived similarity to a particular known group or
event” when they make decisions in the face of uncertainty.73 This
heuristic can prove useful and can help managers avoid paralysis in
difficult decisions. It also, however, can create false assumptions that
cause errors in judgment.74 For example, a CEO or director who knows
of colleagues who have lost their jobs or suffered reputational damage
when their companies filed for bankruptcy might factor that into her
decision. Likewise, she might reference the frequently negative media
coverage of companies that file Chapter 11 cases, such as headlines
reading, With A123’s Bankruptcy, America’s Battery Biz Goes Dead,
and Ding Dong, Are Twinkies Dead?75 These representations likely will
taint her assessment and conclusions regarding the appropriate path for
her distressed company.
Not only might a manager discount a bankruptcy or restructuring
alternative based on a representative heuristic, but a manager also might
honestly believe that she is exceptionally skilled and can turn around her
and Guiding Principles to Make Strategic Decisions, 42 LONG RANGE PLANNING 298, 299
(2009) (“Studies have found systematic, rational analysis insufficient to deal effectively with
complexity. The overall conclusion of the research so far is that experienced decision
makers . . . rely on intuition to supplement, or at times even to substitute for, rational
analysis. . . . Studies suggest that many corporate executives use more intuition than formal
analysis in making decisions.”); T.K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, Cognitive Biases and Strategic
Decision Processes: An Integrative Perspective, 36 J. MGMT. STUD. 757, 773 (1999) (noting that
“[h]euristics and biases are often valuable and indispensable for effective decision making. This
may be particularly relevant for strategic decisions”). But see id. at 760 (describing potential
negative consequences of heuristics on strategic decision-making).
73. Mark R. Kebbell, Damon A. Muller & Kirsty Martin, Understanding and Managing
Bias, in DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTIES IN POLICING SERIOUS CRIME 87, 89 (Gabriele Bammer
ed., 2010). See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) (discussing generally cognitive biases in decisionmaking).
74. See Das & Teng, supra note 72, at 760 (“Although these ‘rules of thumb’ are often
necessary and useful, they also introduce cognitive biases that can lead to severe and systematic
errors in decision making.” (citation omitted)); Sunstein, supra note 71, at 766–67, 775 (noting
how emotions and overconfidence can negatively interfere with decision-making); Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 73, at 1124 (“In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes
they lead to severe and systematic errors.”).
75. Michael V. Copeland, With A123’s Bankruptcy, America’s Battery Biz Goes Dead,
WIRED.COM (Oct. 16, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/10/a123bankruptcy; Ding Dong, Are Twinkies Dead?, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://wvgazette.com/News/Business/201211160143; see also Tiffany Kary & Linda Sandler,
Borders Files Bankruptcy, Is Closing Up to 275 Stores, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 16, 2011, 12:12
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-16/borders-book-chain-files-for-bankruptcyprotection-with-1-29-billion-debt.html.
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company where others could not. Such an overconfidence bias distorts a
decision maker’s assessment of her ability to achieve the desired goal.
Those affected by an overconfidence bias “overestimate their abilities,
believe that they know more than they in fact do, and suffer from an
‘illusion of control,’ believing that they exert more control over results
than they actually do.”76 Commentators consider potential issues with
CEO overconfidence in the context of mergers and acquisitions,
investment decisions, risk assessment, and corporate governance
generally.77 These issues, which include overestimation of the value of
projects and the likelihood of positive outcomes, apply in the context of
distressed companies as well. Indeed, a distressed company may
experience more significant negative consequences because of the CEO’s
unfounded belief that the distress is temporary or that she can help the
company overcome the downturn.78
In theory, other managers and directors should serve as a check to
counter any representative heuristic or overconfidence bias that impairs
a CEO or manager’s decision-making. In practice, however, an
optimism bias may limit the effectiveness of this check. Individuals who
work with the decision-maker may fear that if they dissent to a proposed
course of action they will appear either as disloyal or as an outlier. As
Professors Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman explain:
Organizations also actively discourage pessimism, which is
often interpreted as disloyalty. The bearers of bad news
tend to become pariahs, shunned and ignored by other
employees. When pessimistic opinions are suppressed,
while optimistic ones are rewarded, an organization’s
ability to think critically is undermined. The optimistic
biases of individual employees become mutually
reinforcing, and unrealistic views of the future are validated
by the group.79
76. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 689 (2005).
77. See id. (arguing that corporations should adjust corporate governance to manage CEO
overconfidence); see also Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 597, 624–25 (1989) (discussing optimism and overpayment in corporate takeovers); Ulrike
Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s
Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 42 (2008) (studying confidence in CEOs for M&A transactions
and financial investment decisions); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate
Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 200 (1986) (discussing overconfidence,or “hubris,” in the context of
mergers and acquisitions).
78. See infra Subsection II.C.4; see also Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk
Management, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1323, 1354 (2010) (discussing how CEOs and executives
“overestimate their own abilities” and “believe that they are the exception to the rule”).
79. Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 9, at 60–61.

226

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Accordingly, management may talk each other into a frenzy of
agreement on an ill-fated course of action. Moreover, management may
draw on the support of colleagues and the negative perception of
bankruptcy to confirm the substance of their decision and thereby
introduce a confirmation bias into the equation.80
A fellow manager or director is not the only individual who can
enable or validate a decision maker’s errors in judgment. Professionals
(lawyers, financial advisers, and accountants) who advise corporate
management also can play such a role in a variety of ways. For
example, an adviser may provide information that suggests certain
advantages to the decision maker’s proposed action. Even if the adviser
also explains the disadvantages, the decision-maker likely will latch on
to the positive aspects to confirm her belief. Advisers may soften their
advice to please the client and contribute to an optimism bias. Advisers,
by their words, tone, and phrasing, also may frame issues in a manner
that affects a client’s decision-making process.81
2. The Framing Bias and Restructurings
Studies show that the way a person frames or communicates an issue
affects how others perceive the problem.82 The following data from the

80. In addition, a related bias—commitment bias—may prevent management from
changing their decision even after the error in judgment is recognized. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS
& LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND
COMMITMENT 15 (1977).
81. See Katherina Glac, Understanding Socially Responsible Investing: The Effect of
Decision Frames and Trade-Off Options, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 41, 43–44 (2008) (describing the
operation of framing bias in a clear and relatively detailed manner); Richard W. Painter,
Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397,
404 (2004) (discussing framing bias in the corporate context); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains,
Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 122–23 (1996) (explaining
framing bias generally); Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The
Impact of Cognitive Psychology, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 784 (1997) (explaining framing bias in
investment decisions); X.T. Wang, Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains, 68
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 145, 146 (1996) (discussing framing
bias generally).
82. See Weinstein, supra note 14, at 797 (2003); see also William A. Boettcher III,
Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing Induced Risk
Behavior, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 331, 349 (2004) (discussing a study of how framing affects
public opinion on U.S. military intervention in humanitarian crises); Michael J. Hiscox, Through
a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue
Framing, 60 INT’L ORG. 755, 777–78 (2006) (reporting findings from a study aimed at
measuring the impact of issue framing on individuals’ attitudes in regard to international trade).
See generally Theresa M. Marteau, Framing of Information: Its Influence Upon Decisions of
Doctors and Patients, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 89 (1989) (discussing a study of doctor and
patient decision-making for certain medical treatments and how the presentation of options and
probabilities influences those decisions).
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work of Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman illustrate a
framing bias:
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the
outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact
scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs
are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability
that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability
that no people will be saved
In this version of the problem, a substantial majority of
respondents favor Program A, indicating risk aversion.
Other respondents, selected at random, receive a question
in which the same cover story is followed by a different
description of the options:
If Program A’ is adopted, 400 people will die
If Program B’ is adopted, there is a one-third probability
that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600
people will die
A substantial majority of respondents now favor Program
B’, the risk-seeking option.83
Many commentators suggest that phrasing issues in terms of certain
losses (a loss frame) produces risk-seeking conduct.84 This effect—
which prospect theory also explains—“argues that the value of gains
and losses are experienced differently; for example, people are more
likely to take risks in the domain of losses because of diminishing
sensitivity to large losses, producing a convex portion of the value
function.”85 At least one study suggests that an individual’s desire to
avoid sure losses and seek more risks when presented with a loss frame
intensifies if that individual is also in a high-power position.86 That
study theorizes a link between the optimism bias, often present in
83. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1458 (2003) (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981)).
84. See Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 119. See generally Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory,
Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115 (2003) (agreeing with the general
hypothesis regarding framing and presenting an overview of much of the legal literature on the
subject).
85. Cameron Anderson & Adam D. Galinksy, Power, Optimism, and Risk-Taking, 36
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 511, 520 (2006).
86. Id. at 521.
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individuals who hold positions of power, and framing effects—i.e.,
powerful individuals take more risks when they face certain loss
because they believe that they will beat the odds.87
This effect has direct and significant application to management of
distressed companies. A CEO who perceives bankruptcy as failure will
likely take more risks to avoid that result and will likely believe she will
succeed in her efforts. Likewise, the CEO who receives professional
advice that “bankruptcy should be considered only if all other options
fail” or that “bankruptcy is a last resort” likely will behave in a similar
manner. Accordingly, management of distressed companies may forego
or delay viable restructuring options that relate to bankruptcy in the
hope that they will hit the proverbial home run.
The potential ramifications of heuristics and biases on decisionmaking in the distressed company context raise several important
questions: Do CEOs and management really hold such negative views
of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and, if so, do professional advisers reinforce
these views? Do those views affect management’s decisions for
distressed companies? Does the conversation that surrounds distress and
restructuring need to change?
We conducted the Management Behavior Study to explore these and
related questions. The next Part describes the study and suggests a need
for further research and reevaluation of how management and
professionals think about and discuss restructuring alternatives.
II. ASSESSING MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING IN DISTRESS: THE
MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR STUDY
We probably did take longer (to file for Chapter 11)
than we should have because you never want to have that
feeling of failure and you always want to fight it out.88
Anecdotal evidence suggests that business executives hold a negative
perception of Chapter 11 bankruptcy and delay consideration of
restructuring as an option, often at the expense of the company and its

87. Id. (“This suggests that activating high-power drove individuals to be more risktaking, but that activating low-power did not lead individuals to be more risk averse.”); see also
Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories,
53 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 636, 646 (1987) (discussing the theory of motivated inference
and presenting four studies suggesting that people “generate theories that view their own
attributes as more predictive of desirable outcomes and are reluctant to believe in theories that
imply that their own attributes might be related to undesirable events”).
88. Chelsea Emery, CEOs Wait Too Long Before Filing Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Apr. 2,
2009, 4:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/02/us-bankruptcy-psychologyidUSTRE5310AY20090402 (quoting Joseph Vicens, chief operating officer of
1800mattress.com).
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stakeholders.89 Moreover, business bankruptcy commonly is described as
“an option of last resort” in the commentary and professional advisory
materials on the subject.90 Yet no studies thoroughly analyze in any
meaningful detail these factors or their impact on corporate value or
successful restructurings.91 The Management Behavior Study fills that
void.
As this Article more fully describes below, the Management
Behavior Study offers valuable insight on key components of
management’s decision-making process in the distressed context. The
data include responses from over 400 restructuring professionals and
uncover interesting trends in client advising and decision-making.
Overall, the data suggest a need for policymakers, business executives,
and professionals to reevaluate the dialogue and incentive structure that
surrounds Chapter 11 business cases.
A. Methodology
The Management Behavior Study targeted individuals frequently
involved in business restructurings and Chapter 11 cases—specifically,
professionals such as lawyers and financial advisers who work in this
realm.92 The primary goal of the study was to collect information from
professionals regarding their experiences with and observations about
client advising and management behavior in the distressed company
context. We designed the study to test the following hypothesis:
Management of distressed companies often deny the extent of their
companies’ distress and delay discussions of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing.
We used a database of professionals, which the American Bankruptcy
Institute maintains, to structure the sample population.93 The database
89. Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum
Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1397 (2000) (“[M]anagers will
seek to preserve their control of the firm despite the costs to investors, even if they only are able
to delay their own day of reckoning by a few months.”).
90. See DiDonato & Wikel, supra note 38, at 1 (discussing the tendency of directors to
“exhaust ‘out of court’ restructuring options such as asset or business sales, amending their
credit facilities and seeking replacement or bridging capital to improve the company’s liquidity
position and ‘weather the storm’”); Ian Mount, Adviser to Businesses Laments Changes to
Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2012, at B9 (stating that Chapter 11 is “an absolute last
resort”).
91. For a thoughtful survey of empirical literature concerned with Chapter 11
bankruptcies, see generally Senbet & Wang, supra note 24, at 27–47.
92. The survey specifically asked respondents to identify their typical role in restructuring
matters. See infra Section II.C. We did not exclude individuals based on the identity of their
typical clients. Rather, we sought to capture both the company and stakeholder perspectives on
the process because they recognized that professionals who primarily represented stakeholders
might have a limited or different perspective on certain questions.
93. The American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) “is the largest multi-disciplinary, non-
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contained 2,296 individuals. We reviewed the database and identified a
sample frame of 2,181 individuals.94 We then drew a random sample of
1,200 individuals. After we identified ineligible respondents, we invited
1,160 individuals to participate.95 The data collection schedule included
an initial email request (sent September 24, 2012), two reminder email
requests (sent October 1 and October 22, 2012), one reminder letter
(mailed October 12, 2012), and one clarification email (sent October 22,
2012). We received 453 responses to the study for a valid response rate of
39.1%.96
B. Study Design
We designed a survey tool to facilitate the Management Behavior
Study. The survey included twenty questions carefully crafted to elicit
non-privileged information concerning professionals’ experiences with
management of distressed companies.97 The majority of the questions
used objective choices, with the opportunity for respondents to explain
certain responses in a narrative format. The survey was web based and
included programmed skip patterns to minimize respondent error.
The core questions in the survey focused on the concept of
bankruptcy as “an option of last resort” and management’s reaction to
that concept and their companies’ distress generally. The survey also
asked for information about the timing of bankruptcy filings and the key
drivers behind that decision. In addition, it collected information on
respondents’ respective industries and extent of experience in
restructuring matters. A copy of the survey is annexed at Appendix A.

partisan organization dedicated to research and education on matters related to insolvency.”
About ABI, AM. BANKR. INST., http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section
=About_ABI (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). The ABI is not a sponsor of this study. The ABI’s only
involvement with this study was to provide us with a copy of the database. Professor Harner has,
however, previously received grant funding from the ABI and is the Reporter for the ABI
Commission Studying the Reform of Chapter 11.
94. One-hundred-and-fifteen individuals in the database previously opted out of
communications with SurveyMonkey, the software the authors used to administer the online
survey.
95. In their review of the database, we determined that certain individuals were ineligible
for the study either because of their profession (e.g., they were no longer in private practice or
had no recent or relevant private practice experience), potential conflicts, or had previously
opted out of the web-based survey tool.
96. According to a recent meta-analysis, the average response rate for web surveys is
34%. See Tse-Hua Shih & Xitao Fan, Comparing Response Rates from Web and Mail Surveys:
A Meta-Analysis, 20 FIELD METHODS 249, 257 (2008).
97. We tested the survey questions with professionals whom the database did not include
and refined the questions based on those responses.
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C. Key Study Data and Results
The survey data provide a glimpse into management’s decisionmaking process based on the experiences of some professionals working
with distressed companies in restructuring matters.98 Although the data
do not provide a complete picture—and the results are subject to the
limitations typically applicable to this type of survey99—they offer
meaningful insights into framing effects that may influence decisionmaking in the context of distressed companies. In fact, the survey data
acknowledge the prevalent use of loss framing by professionals in the
industry and how that might impact management decisions that concern
restructuring options.
1. General Types of Respondents and Their Experiences
The majority of professionals are lawyers (85.9%), though financial
consultants represent approximately 12.9% of the respondents.100 They
work in firms of all sizes, as 44.7% work in firms that employ more
than 100 lawyers, advisers, or bankers, as applicable, and 55.3% work
in firms that employ 100 professionals or less. They also are a very
experienced population, as 78.6% of the professionals have more than
fifteen years of experience in the restructuring field.
In the majority of their restructuring matters, these professionals
primarily represented distressed companies (39.0%), secured creditors
(21.3%), or different parties depending on the matter (26.6%).101 The
majority of their matters involved assets of $100 million or less
(64.8%). Approximately 12.2% of respondents indicated that the
98. Although the response rate for the survey exceeds industry averages, see supra note
96, it may be the case that respondents differ from nonrespondents on key statistics of interest
(an empirical question to investigate in a future study).
99. Sample surveys are subject to a variety of errors that include coverage, sampling,
nonresponse, and measurement. See generally ROBERT M. GROVES, SURVEY ERRORS AND
SURVEY COSTS (1989) (discussing errors involved in sample surveys). To the extent that the list
of professionals the American Bankruptcy Institute maintains does not represent the universe of
such professionals, coverage error may be present. That is, the authors can only generalize the
results to the population of professionals the sampling frame includes. Sampling error occurs in
all sample surveys, by definition. For this survey, the sampling margin of error is +/- 2%. To the
extent that nonrespondents to this survey differ from respondents on key variables of interest,
nonresponse error may be present. Finally, to the extent that survey responses are inaccurate,
measurement error may be present. See id. at 82–83, 133, 240, 295.
100. The data percentages this Article presents are based on valid responses; for example,
50 respondents did not answer the question that concerned profession type, so these percentages
are based on 403 respondents. The footnotes identify the number of respondents who answered
a particular question if the question was missing a large segment of the population. Also, the
Article uses the term “financial consultant” to represent financial advisers, investment bankers,
and restructuring consultants.
101. A small segment of the population represented unsecured creditors (9.4%) or equity
holders (1.0%), and 2.7% designated “other” as their response.
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average size of their matters involved assets of more than $500
million.102 This allocation is similar to the general demographics of
companies that file Chapter 11 cases.103
2. What Professionals Say
The majority of professionals (63.6 %) describe bankruptcy as “an
option of last resort” or use a similar phrase when they discuss
restructuring options with their distressed clients.104 Of those
professionals who use the phrase, 39.3% use it most of the time and
41.8% use it some of the time; only 11.8% use it in all circumstances
(Table 1).105 The data show no significant effects based on profession
type or whom the professional typically represents in distressed
matters.106 Nevertheless, professionals with more than fifteen years of
experience are significantly more likely to use the phrase than those
with fewer years of experience (p<.001).

102. Approximately 6% of these respondents indicated that the average size of their
distressed matters involved debtors with assets of $1 billion or more.
103. For data that describes the general range of Chapter 11 cases, see Elizabeth Warren &
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 603, 607–10 (2009); Douglas Baird, Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and
Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=866865 (discussing small and
large bankruptcy case data).
104. The survey tool focused on both financial and economic distress, but it did not attempt
to distinguish between the two. Specifically, it defined “distressed client(s)” as “business entity
clients (both incorporated and unincorporated entities) that are experiencing or should anticipate
experiencing financial distress, such as actual or potential loan defaults, liquidity issues,
litigation risks, operational issues, balance sheet insolvency, or equitable insolvency.”
105. Responses were based on professionals’ experiences during the past five years.
106. Due to small subsample and cell sizes, statistical comparisons are possible among
only professional types and client types on a collapsed variable (“all or most” versus
“approximately half, some, or none”). Just over 50% of lawyers reported their use of such a
phrase with “all or most” of their clients; similarly, 44% of financial advisers reported their use
of such a phrase with “all or most” of their clients (p=.357). Small subsample and cell sizes
permit statistical comparisons among client types such that the authors distinguished only
among professionals to distressed companies or secured or unsecured creditors. The authors
combined all other professionals into a fourth group. There is no significant difference in the
percentage of professionals who used such a phrase with “all or most” of their clients by client
type (p=.065). Interestingly, while only 37.3% of professionals to unsecured creditors reported
such phrase usage, the majority of professionals to all other client types reported such usage
(distressed companies: 53.2%; secured creditors: 65%; all others: 58.5%). The tests may prove
insufficiently powered to detect a statistical difference among these groups.
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Table 1. Proportion of Distressed Clients with Whom Phrase Used in
Past 5 Years (n=280)
None

25.0%

0%

Some

Approximately half

41.8%

20%

40%

4.6%

60%

Most

39.3%

80%

All

11.8%

100%

Notably not all professionals use the phrase “bankruptcy as an option
of last resort” to mean the same thing. Approximately half (52%) of the
respondents use the phrase to mean that the “[d]istressed client should
file a bankruptcy case only if it represents the alternative most likely to
preserve or maximize value.”107 This use suggests that these
professionals view bankruptcy as one of the many restructuring tools
available to distressed clients that their clients should integrate into any
meaningful restructuring discussions. Approximately 40% of the
respondents, however, use the phrase to mean that the “[d]istressed
client should file a bankruptcy case only after exhausting all of its outof-court restructuring alternatives.”108 This use carries a very different
connotation. It arguably equates bankruptcy with complete failure.

107. See infra Table 2.
108. Id.
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Table 2. Phrase Meaning (n=273)

File only if it represents alternative most
likely to preserve or maximize value

52.0%

File only after exhausting all of its outof-court restructuring alternatives
File only if necessary to prevent
creditors from exercising default
remedies
Other

39.9%

2.9%

5.1%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%

A professional’s decision to use the phrase “bankruptcy as an option
of last resort”—regardless of the professional’s ultimate meaning—is
understandable for the variety of reasons this Article discusses above.109
For example, bankruptcy can be an expensive process. In fact, the
majority (52.1%) of professionals who invoke the phrase cite cost as the
most common reason they describe bankruptcy in this manner.110 In
addition, professionals cite the uncertainty of the bankruptcy process
(23.2%) and the potential loss of management control (12.0%) as the
most common reasons that underlie their advice.111 Interestingly, only
3.4% of respondents indicate loss of creditor control as a motivating
factor.112 Although this perception may relate to the fact that many
respondents represent debtors, the data also support literature that
suggests a trend of less debtor, and more creditor, control in both
Chapter 11 cases and in restructuring matters generally.113

109. See supra Section I.A.
110. See infra Table 3.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra Section I.A. In fact, several respondents commented that all response
options other than “loss of creditor control” contributed to their use of the phrase “bankruptcy as
an option of last resort.”
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Cost and delay associated with
bankruptcy case

52.1%

Uncertainty associated with
bankruptcy case

23.2%

Loss of debtor control in bankruptcy
case, including in chapter 11 case
Loss of creditor control in bankruptcy
case, including in chapter 11 case
Other
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12.0%
3.4%
9.4%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%

Table 3. Reason for Phrase Meaning (n=267)
A distressed company should not undertake the filing of a
Chapter 11 or any bankruptcy case lightly. The process can prove
expensive, lengthy, and contentious.114 It also can, however, balance
negotiating leverage and offer restructuring options, such as the
facilitation of asset sales and the management of contract portfolios, not
otherwise available to the parties.115 Moreover, the utility of these
bankruptcy-specific tools may depend on the financial state of the
company when it files for bankruptcy. Accordingly, how a distressed
company receives and processes a professional’s advice to use
“bankruptcy as an option of last resort” may significantly impact the
outcome of any bankruptcy case.
3. What Clients Hear
To understand how clients might respond to the phrase “bankruptcy
as an option of last resort,” the survey asked several questions regarding
the conduct of distressed clients in the restructuring representation. Of
those professionals who used the phrase, a majority (51.6%) indicated
that they have had a distressed client who refused to authorize the
preparation of a bankruptcy filing at a time the professional thought
appropriate.116 An overwhelming majority (90.0%) of those clients
114. See supra Section I.A.
115. See supra Section I.A.
116. See infra Table 4. Clients appear more comfortable with professionals who discuss a
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ultimately filed a bankruptcy case.117 These professionals indicated that
approximately 36% of the clients who rejected their advice to prepare
bankruptcy materials did so because they believed the company’s
distress was temporary or they denied the distress altogether.118
Table 4. Initially Refused (n=426) / (If yes) Eventual Bankruptcy Case
Filing (n=220)

Filed,
90.0%
No, 48.4%

Yes, 51.6%

Not Filed, 9.5%
Missing, 0.5%

potential bankruptcy filing in the context of negotiations with creditors. Only 31% of
respondents reported having a distressed client who refused to authorize the professional to
discuss a bankruptcy filing in the context of negotiations. Notably these data raise several
related issues. For example, some commentators may argue that professionals want to prepare a
case simply because of the fees generated by such activity. SOL STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS:
INSIDE CHAPTER 11—AN EXPOSE 2 (1989). Other commentators may question clients who
authorize discussion of a bankruptcy filing in negotiations if the client does not intend to file
such a case. Ivan J. Reich, Managing the Insolvency of a Borrower from Both the Debtor’s and
Creditor’s Perspective During Tough Economic Times, ASPATORE (Apr. 2009), 2009 WL
1615228, at *11 (discussing the reputational value in making honest, not empty, “threats”
regarding filing for bankruptcy). Accordingly, future studies should consider these issues.
117. See infra Table 4.
118. See infra Table 5; infra Appendix A, question 7. Specifically, these two responses
were worded, “Belief that financial difficulties were temporary or short-term in nature,” and
“General denial about financial or operational obstacles facing company.” The second most
common reason respondents gave for clients’ reluctance to authorize the preparation of
bankruptcy materials was potential negative impact on sales, with 23.8% of respondents
identifying that secondary factor. The potential stigma associated with bankruptcy accounted for
only 14.7% of the responses regarding the most common reason distressed clients resist
bankruptcy preparations.

2014]

FACILITATING SUCCESSFUL FAILURES

237

Table 5. Reasons for Reluctance to Prepare Materials
Most Common Reason (n=218)

Second Most Common (n=214)

General denial

35.8%

13.7%
21.6%
23.4%

Impact on customers/sales
14.7%
17.4%

Perceived stigma

13.3%
11.5%

Belief that difficulties temporary
6.9%

Impact on supply relationships
Loss of control and creditor oversight
Multiple

3.7%

8.2%

2.3%
2.8%

Management disagreement

1.4%
1.8%

Missing

1.8%

0.0%

19.3%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

These data suggest a moderate association between loss framing
(bankruptcy as a last resort) and clients taking a high-stakes gamble
(e.g., betting that operations will turn around or a white knight will save
the company from its despair).119 In addition, the most frequently stated
reason for clients’ attempts to avoid bankruptcy (general denial of
problems) suggests an optimism bias or belief that the company can
overcome its existing financial or operational problems. These data
collectively allude to some of the observations in prior studies that
concern framing effects and prospect theory.120 Nevertheless, scholars
should conduct more research on these issues in the distressed context.
For example, the survey asked respondents generally about their
experiences and observations from practice. Although the respondents
bring a wealth of experience to the study, the data are generic in the
sense that they do not document specific examples or offer evidence
directly from the distressed company’s perspective. Given the structure
of the Management Behavior Study, such direct observations are
119. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 67, at 1227 n.54 (“[M]anagers of financially
distressed firms ‘have a strong incentive to gamble with the firm’s assets.’” (quoting Barry E.
Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 575,
576 (1995))); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729, 733–34
(noting that managers have similar incentives to gamble on the company’s future); David A.
Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 471, 508 (1994) (noting that “shareholders of an insolvent company have little to lose if
they gamble with the firm’s assets, [but have] much to gain”).
120. See supra Section I.B.
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impracticable due to, among other things, concerns regarding
confidentiality and the attorney–client privilege. Indeed, client-specific
observations—from either the professional’s or the client’s
perspective—may breach a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality or arguably
waive some aspect of the attorney-client privilege on the topic.121
Accordingly, researchers should continue to explore indirect or
quantitative means to document the loss or gain frames they use in the
restructuring dialogue and their potential impact.122
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Management Behavior Study
offers insights into distressed companies’ decision-making processes
that otherwise are not available. The prevalence of the use of loss
framing alone is a meaningful contribution. The data permit inferences
that can help policymakers question and reconsider how to legislate
distress. They also can help restructuring professionals and business
executives reevaluate how they approach potential restructuring options.
Part III discusses these considerations.
4. Does the Dialogue Matter?
The descriptive data above explain how professionals approach the
restructuring dialogue with distressed clients and how they perceive
clients’ resulting behavior. Further analysis of the data shows several
significant effects and trends relevant to the study’s hypothesis.
As explained above, studies suggest a correlation between loss
frames and risk-seeking conduct. To identify any similar effects in the
distressed company context, the survey asked respondents a variety of
questions concerning their use of the phrase “bankruptcy as a last
resort” and clients’ reactions to restructuring alternatives. Several
interesting trends emerged.
Both respondents who used the phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort”
and those who did not reported experiences with distressed clients who
refused to authorize the preparation of a bankruptcy case or introduce a
bankruptcy alternative into restructuring negotiations at a time the
professional thought appropriate. Likewise, both groups suggested that
at least some of those clients ultimately filed a bankruptcy case.
Nevertheless, respondents who never used the phrase “bankruptcy as a
last resort” were significantly more likely to have a client who initially
refused, but ultimately did, file a bankruptcy case. Specifically, 87.2%
of those who used such a phrase and 96.2% of those who never used
121. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 (2000).
122. For example, researchers might design a simulation study in which participants
answer hypothetical questions from the distressed company’s perspective based on realistic fact
patterns developed through case studies.
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such a phrase experienced a client who initially refused but ultimately
filed (p=.032).
The data suggest that professionals who do not introduce a loss
frame into their strategy discussions with distressed clients generally
have clients who are more willing to ultimately file a bankruptcy case.
Other data support this inference. For example, respondents who used
the phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort” with all or most of their clients
in the past five years were less likely to have a client who initially
refused, but ultimately filed, a bankruptcy case. Specifically, 82.9% of
those who used such a phrase with all or most of their clients and 92.3%
of those who used such a phrase with less than most of their clients
experienced a client who initially refused, but ultimately filed, a case.123
Based on the survey data, clients who hear the phrase “bankruptcy as a
last resort” are more likely to pursue restructuring alternatives that
avoid a bankruptcy filing.
Accordingly, prospect theory and the perceived correlation between
loss framing and risk-seeking conduct may explain the trend in the data.
This suggests that the use of the phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort”
causes directors and managers to pursue riskier or less certain
restructuring alternatives. For example, in an effort to fix the company’s
financial or operational problems and avoid a bankruptcy filing, these
directors and managers might agree to an out-of-court refinancing with
exceptionally tight covenants and onerous fees and interest rates.
Confirmation and overconfidence biases also might contribute to
these decisions. Given the data and the role of heuristics in corporate
restructurings, the following respondent narratives are illuminating.
Respondents provided the following statements and explained why their
clients generally refused to authorize the preparation of a bankruptcy
case or the discussion of bankruptcy alternatives in restructuring
negotiations:
“[B]elief that other alternatives (additional financing or
asset sale or sale of company) would come through before
liquidity crises forced filing.”
“Unfounded optimism that management could handle
turnaround without benefits of bankruptcy.”
“Client is in denial—something else will ‘rescue’ them
from chapter 11.”
“Trying to negotiate a better deal with creditors.”

123. The difference does not reach statistical significance at traditional alpha levels likely
due to insufficient power; however, the difference is in the hypothesized direction and trends
toward significance (p=.095).
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“Unrealistic belief that the lender was actually working
WITH them.”124
These statements support the hypothesis that cognitive biases and
framing effects influence decisions in the distressed company context.
Prospect theory and heuristics are, however, only one plausible
explanation. The study’s findings do not prove a causal link between the
phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort” and a client’s ultimate restructuring
path. As this Article explains above, the design of the survey limits data
analysis and our ability to isolate effects. For example, the respondents
who reported that their clients, who initially refused to authorize the
preparation of a bankruptcy case and also did not ultimately file a
bankruptcy case, might have successfully resolved their clients’ distress
in an out-of-court process. Likewise, discussions with, or pressures
from, individuals other than the company’s professionals, such as
creditors and equity investors, may have influenced the company’s
decision. Moreover, the company simply may not have been able to
secure debtor-in-possession financing to sustain a bankruptcy case, or
the company may have held an asset or business that a filing would
have adversely affected. The authors recognize these potential
confounding factors and encourage further study of these issues.
Nevertheless, the Management Behavior Study offers a first glimpse
into distressed companies’ counseling and decision-making processes
and should inform future policy decisions.
III. CHANGING THE FRAME TO FACILITATE BETTER RESULTS
An effective bankruptcy system is vital to a well-functioning
economy.125 It can encourage entrepreneurial activity and spur economic
development.126 The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code wisely balanced the
goals of rehabilitation with value maximization to rehabilitate distressed
companies where that end generated the greatest value for all. Notably,
many commentators observe that the Bankruptcy Code no longer governs

124. Responses to Management Behavior Study (on file with authors).
125. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking,
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 333, 335, 354 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in
an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 343–44 (1993).
126. See Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do About It, 28
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 856–58 (2007) (noting that bankruptcy can provide entrepreneurs
with a fresh start and that entrepreneurs are more likely to live in states with higher bankruptcy
exemption levels); see also Warren, supra note 125, at 342, 342 n.14 (noting the higher rate of
bankruptcy filings among entrepreneurs and small business owners); cf. Douglas G. Baird &
Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2310, 2312, 2316 (2005) (acknowledging some value in Chapter 11 for entrepreneurs but
arguing that the current process is inefficient, particularly for serial entrepreneurs).
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as intended.127 The Bankruptcy Code certainly cannot facilitate successful
reorganizations if distressed companies try to avoid its application at all
reasonable costs.
This Part considers these observations in light of the Management
Behavior Study and proposes potential changes to the restructuring
landscape to facilitate more successful failures. It first reviews the
existing restructuring landscape and the potential challenges for
distressed companies that operate in the current environment. This
examination leads to several potential policy and legislative changes to
mitigate the real (or perceived) concerns of distressed companies that
consider a bankruptcy filing. These proposals focus on one aspect of the
U.S. bankruptcy system—hybrid restructurings—and suggest a
streamlined process and an incentive structure that work not only for
distressed companies but also for their stakeholders.
A. The Need for Change
The Bankruptcy Code is the fifth set of federal bankruptcy laws enacted
in the United States.128 Its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the
Bankruptcy Act), is the only other long-standing piece of legislation, given
the short-lived nature of all prior federal bankruptcy statutes.129
Practitioners and policymakers considered reform of the Bankruptcy Act in
1968 because, among other things, public companies resisted Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act, which was the chapter specifically designated for
those cases.130 Many of these companies either did not file to obtain the
127. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439,
443 (1992) (“[B]ankruptcy’s reallocative provisions, including bankruptcy reorganization, its
most pernicious reallocation vehicle, lack justification and [] Congress should abolish them.”);
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751
(2002) (“Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make headlines
when they file for Chapter 11, but they are no longer using it to rescue a firm from imminent
failure.”); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101
YALE L.J. 1043, 1088–89 (1992) (“Chapter 11 should be repealed and replaced” because there is
no economic benefit from the current model of court-supervised corporate reorganizations);
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 611 (1993) (concluding that Chapter 11 has
mixed success and “is not a complete failure”).
128. Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV.
941, 941 (1979).
129. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 13–14, 23, 29–30 (1995) (discussing the frequent and significant
changes to bankruptcy laws prior to the Chandler Act, and noting the forty-year period the
Chandler Act was in effect).
130. Chapter X broke with the past in that Chapter X replaced with an independent trustee
a company’s existing managers, who had previously continued to run the business, and the
company’s existing bankers, who had previously run the reorganization. The independent
trustee, alone, retained the power to develop the terms of the reorganization. By its terms, it
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relief they needed or they tried to qualify for relief under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act, which was designed for small business cases.131 These
developments undercut the value of the Bankruptcy Act and did not serve
the interests of public companies or their stakeholders.132
The resulting reforms produced the existing Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. As this Article discusses above, however, a shift
away from Chapter 11—similar to that which occurred in 1950s in the
context of Chapter X133—is afoot. The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code
indicate that it likely has outlived its shelf life and that it is time once
again for reform.134 Although many commentators cite several different
factors to support reform,135 this Article focuses on a factor not yet

required public companies and companies with liabilities in excess of $250,000 to file in
Chapter X; however, companies found a loophole and sought to avoid Chapter X at all costs.
SKEEL, supra note 45, at 119–20, 162. Moreover, Chapter X could implicate significant
government involvement; Chapter X aimed to “afford greater protection to creditors and
stockholders by providing . . . impartial and expert administrative assistance in corporate
reorganizations through . . . active participation of the SEC.’” SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co.,
379 U.S. 594, 604 (1965); see also Allen F. Corotto & Irving H. Picard, Business
Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978—A New Approach to Investor
Protections and the Role of the SEC, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 962 (1979) (discussing SEC
involvement in corporate reorganization under Chapter X); Paul R. Glassman, Solicitation of
Plan Rejections Under the Bankruptcy Code, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 261, 262–64 (1988)
(discussing the features and workflow of Chapter X); Klee, supra note 128, at 942 (noting that
Senator Quentin Burdick chaired hearings conducted by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1968
to determine whether to form a commission to review the bankruptcy laws).
131. The drafters designed Chapter XI, in contrast to Chapter X of the Chandler Act, for
small corporate debtors and mom-and-pop firms. Chapter XI allowed the company management
to continue to run the business during the reorganization and also allowed the company to
choose counsel and professional staff to administer the reorganization process. SKEEL, supra
note 45, at 162–63.
132. Id. at 172 (noting that many large firms that would benefit from a thoughtful
reorganization process did not “view[] bankruptcy as part of the ordinary arsenal of weapons for
solving corporate problems” during the Chandler Act era, and, as such, filed for bankruptcy
“only as an absolute last resort”).
133. See id. at 162.
134. See Kenneth N. Klee & Richard Levin, Rethinking Chapter 11, 21 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 5 art. 1 (Nov. 2012) (“[T]he chapter 11 system is itself in distress, having been asked to
do far more than it was designed to do . . . . [S]everal efforts are underway among the practicing
bar to rethink[ ]chapter 11, with a view toward making it work with today’s (and tomorrow’s)
economic and financial system.”). The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) is one example of reforms to the current Bankruptcy Code. See
generally Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The
Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603 (2005) (discussing BAPCPA in detail).
135. Klee & Levin, supra note 134, art. 1 (considering reform of four areas of
reorganization: corporate governance, DIP financing, the “sale of all or substantially all of the
business’s assets, and reorganization plan voting and distribution issues”).
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discussed in the literature—the underutilization of the Bankruptcy
Code.136
After a spike in early 2009, the number of Chapter 11 filings has
been steadily decreasing.137 Commentators acknowledge that fewer
companies choose Chapter 11 as a viable restructuring option, and those
companies that file are mainly selling or liquidating.138 In this respect,
bankruptcy really is an option of last resort—a place where companies
go to die. Any changes to this emerging reality will take more than a
few legislative tweaks, and a complete overhaul of the bankruptcy
system is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, this Article
focuses on one critical component of the current and any future
bankruptcy legislation: the creation of a nonthreatening environment
and streamlined process that distressed companies (and their creditors)
willingly embrace.
B. Encouraging More Hybrid Restructurings
A thoughtful study by the World Bank defines hybrid restructurings
as “workout procedures in which there is a mixture of the features of
contractual workouts and limited court intervention.”139 The World
Bank discusses hybrid procedures as one alternative in its “continuum
of procedures for the treatment of financial difficulties.”140 Likewise,
this Article contemplates the use of hybrid restructurings as part of a
robust system for distress resolution.
In the United States, the prepackaged and, to some extent, the
prearranged Chapter 11 cases represent hybrid restructurings. As
Subsection I.A.3 discusses, however, both alternatives are limited in
application and utility. Neither alternative is available to all distressed
companies; rather, companies generally need a small group of creditors,
136. See supra Subsection I.A.2.
137. Jacob Barron, Commercial Bankruptcies Down 22% in 2012, NAT’L ASS’N CREDIT
MGMT. BLOG (Jan. 8, 2013), http://blog.nacm.org/blog/jake-blog/commercial-bankruptciesdown-22-in-2012; Jonathan Carson & Michael Frishberg, Mapping Administrative Strategies to
Changing Paradigms of Chapter 11, ASPATORE (Sept. 2010), 2010 WL 3650164, at *2;
Bankruptcy Filings Down in Fiscal Year 2012, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://news.uscourts.gov/bankruptcy-filings-down-fiscal-year-2012.
138. Robert D. Wilcox, The Current Bankruptcy Environment: What Lawyers Need to
Know, ASPATORE, (Nov. 2010), 2010 WL 4735524, at *1, *2, *7 (noting that companies
perceive the Chapter 11 alternatives as a better choice for reorganization and that companies
increasingly use bankruptcy as a way to sell assets free and clear of liabilities rather than for
reorganization). In addition, some practitioners see a pronounced spike in creditor use of
receivership proceedings, which may or may not also include a Chapter 11 proceeding. Jeffrey
R. Barber, Shifting Economic Landscape, Shifting Legal Strategies: The Increased Use of
Receivership Proceedings and Selected Bankruptcy Trends, ASPATORE (Feb. 2011), 2011 WL
586145, at *1.
139. GARRIDO, supra note 56, at 47.
140. Id. at 3.

244

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

limited financial or operational problems, or a certain capital structure
to invoke either a prepackaged or prearranged process successfully.141
Moreover, a distressed company that tries but fails to implement one of
these hybrid restructurings receives little, if any, credit for those efforts
in any subsequent bankruptcy case.
Despite these challenges, hybrid restructurings are an important key
to unlocking the potential value of the bankruptcy process for many
companies. If companies implement hybrid restructurings appropriately,
then they can encourage earlier acknowledgement of distress, more
meaningful restructuring negotiations with a broader group of
constituencies, and more efficient resolutions. Any such structure,
however, must integrate incentives and tools to mitigate some of the
heuristics the Management Behavior Survey identifies. The “meet and
confer” process this Article discusses below combines certain
advantages of a formal bankruptcy filing with the flexibility and speed
of an out-of-court restructuring as well as the enhanced options for
companies that proactively manage their distress.
1. Overview of Meet and Confer
The meet and confer process (the MCP) would facilitate broad
restructuring negotiations in the shadows of a formal bankruptcy case,
but with more certainty and greater restructuring options than the
current prepackaged or prearranged plan process. A company could file
a notice in the appropriate district or bankruptcy court (the MC Notice)
and initiate an MCP.142 This notice would identify the company and any
affiliates involved in the MCP; the company’s secured creditors; the
company’s stakeholder committee (discussed below); and the name of a
proposed facilitator to assist the parties in their discussions and the
development of a proposed plan.143 The MC Notice would trigger a
short standstill period, which would enjoin creditors from the exercise
of their collection rights against the company, and the company could
pay only ordinary course business expenses.144 The MCP could end in
one of several ways: the company’s commencement of a formal case
primarily to solicit acceptance and confirmation of the negotiated plan;
the company’s commencement of a formal, more traditional case with
enhanced options (e.g., a longer exclusive period to file a plan and
additional time to determine treatment of contracts and leases); or the
company’s dismissal of the MC notice (e.g., the key parties either reach
141. See supra Subsection I.A.3.
142. The mechanics of the filing process could be similar to those that § 301 of the
Bankruptcy Code uses for the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). The
primary difference would be in the effect of the filing and the resulting process.
143. See infra Subsection III.B.2.
144. See infra Subsection III.B.3.
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a consensual out-of-court plan that does not require court
implementation or they agree that the state law should govern the
company’s reorganization).145
The MCP would strive to create a stable and productive environment
for the distressed company and its creditors. The standstill and
contemplated multiparty negotiation format would allow the parties to
focus on the causes and potential resolution of the company’s distress
without the distractions and often counterproductive noise that
surrounds the first days of a formal bankruptcy case.146 Although still a
quasi-judicial process, directors and managers may feel less threatened
by the MCP because the process would not force them to operate inside
of a fishbowl during what is often the most sensitive period of
restructuring negotiations. They also would retain authority to dismiss
the MCP at any point, but would receive “credit” for their efforts if they
ultimately decide a formal, more traditional case is necessary.147 In
many ways, the MCP offers great potential upside with little downside
risk. It is a restructuring alternative that seeks to shift the bankruptcy
discussion to a gain frame and promote more timely utilization by
distressed companies.148
2. The MC Notice and the Parties
A traditional bankruptcy filing requires a large amount of preparation,
paperwork, and effort.149 Those elements can distract management and
professionals from core issues that surround the company’s distress and
cause management to doubt the value of the bankruptcy process. As one
respondent to the Management Behavior Study observed, clients resisted
preparation of a bankruptcy filing because of “[c]ost and the fact that the
145. See infra Subsection III.B.4.
146. See David Anthony, Big New Case in Nashville Bankruptcy Court, CREDITORS
RIGHTS 101 BLOG (June 12, 2012), http://creditorsrights101.com/tag/first-day-motions
(discussing the excitement for first-day motions in larger Chapter 11 cases); AMERICAN
BANKR. INST., ABI COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 FIELD HEARING:
MINUTES/SUMMARY (Nov. 30,
2012),
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/
files/ABI%20Commission%20Minutes%20Nov_30_2012.docx/ (discussing the complexity of
first day motions hearings).
147. See infra Subsection III.B.4.
148. See supra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing CEO risk-taking to avoid a perceived failure in
filing for bankruptcy); cf. Kahneman, supra note 83, at 1456 (noting that when decision-makers
face certain loss, they engage in more risk-seeking behavior).
149. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1002 (providing that voluntary case is commenced by filing
petition with the court); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007 (noting the various lists, schedules, statements,
and other documents that must accompany the petition). For a discussion of first-day motions
practice, see generally Jay M. Goffman & Grenville R. Day, First Day Motions and Orders in
Large Chapter 11 Cases: (Critical Vendor, DIP Financing and Cash Management Issues), 12 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 59, 63–73 (2003).
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results that might be achieved did not justify the risk.”150 The MCP
lowers entry barriers to the types of restructuring negotiations that
formal cases often facilitate.
The MC Notice would invoke the jurisdiction of the court primarily
to enforce the standstill period this Article discusses below151 and to
streamline the commencement of a formal case when such is the exit
strategy of choice that follows the MCP. Only a company, as debtor,
could file an MC Notice, and the court could require affidavits from the
company’s top executives and professionals that certify that the
company filed the notice in good faith and in accordance with the
statutory requirements.152 The applicable statute could include
appropriate safeguards and allow a company to file an MC Notice only
if it is not in default or subject to a notice of default under any of its
secured credit obligations or some set percentage of its unsecured debt;
if it does not file the MC Notice in response to a specific enforcement
action or litigation matter; and if it did not file a bankruptcy case or MC
Notice in the past 180 days (or some other appropriate period). These
requirements ultimately should be designed to deter parties who use the
MCP as a delay tactic and to encourage parties to initiate the
restructuring negotiations earlier in the company’s distress.
The MC Notice would identify the key parties to the restructuring
negotiations. In addition to the company’s secured creditors, the
company should identify representatives of its major unsecured creditor
groups and interest holders to form its stakeholder committee.153 The
company should ground the stakeholder committee in type of interest,
rather than size of those interests, to ensure a dynamic discussion of the
company’s restructuring options.154 The company would pay the fees
150. Response to Management Behavior Study (on file with authors).
151. See infra Subsection III.B.3.
152. Creditors who wish to file an involuntary petition against a debtor must meet the
initial conditions. If the court dismisses their case, the court may require the creditors to pay
costs, or, if the court determines that the creditors filed the involuntary petition in bad faith, the
court may subject the creditors to significant damages. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), 303(i) (2006).
153. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of
the Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749, 754
(2011) (“A creditors’ committee is designed to protect and promote the interests of general
unsecured creditors.”); id. at 781, 784, 788–89 (discussing performance of creditors’ committees
in promoting unsecured creditors’ interests); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind
Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1155, 1161 (2011) (“[T]he creditors’ committee often is central to ensuring a fair and successful
reorganization process.”); Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 717 (2010)
(suggesting a role for a shareholder representative “to do the shareholder job of monitoring
management”).
154. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, The Potential Value of Dynamic Tension in
Restructuring Negotiations, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2011 (discussing how competing
agendas, along with active engagement in a bankruptcy case—i.e., the dynamic tension—may
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for counsel the stakeholder committee selects and retains, provided that
the company could request that the court order a member of the
committee or any secured creditor to pay its own counsel and other
advisor fees upon a showing of bad faith or obstructionist conduct by
that party.
The MC Notice also would identify a third-party neutral to serve as
facilitator in the restructuring negotiations.155 The facilitator should be
completely disinterested in the matter.156 The facilitator’s primary
objective should be to foster meaningful and informed dialogue among
the parties and assist the company in its evaluation of its restructuring
alternatives. The facilitator also might serve a valuable and ongoing role
in any subsequent formal bankruptcy case.157
3. The Standstill
The standstill period is necessary to create a stable and safe
environment for the restructuring negotiations. Under existing U.S. laws
that govern hybrid procedures, companies can obtain a standstill only
through a contractual agreement with their creditors in an out-of-court
proceeding.158 Because the MC Notice triggers the quasi-judicial nature
of the MCP, it permits a broader standstill agreement that levels the
playing field and allows more parties a seat at the negotiating table, but

result in better outcomes for those cases).
155. Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate
Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 475 (2011) (discussing a role for a third-party
neutral who could serve as an objective party, and facilitate the flow of information, with the
ultimate goals of reducing conflict, correcting information asymmetries, and enhancing estate
value for all stakeholders); id. at 516–17 (noting how the use of third-party neutrals,or “case
facilitator,” experienced limited success in the United Kingdom in its encouragement of out-ofcourt workouts as well).
156. Id. at 508 (“[L]ack of independence may create biases and increase rather than resolve
conflicts in the restructuring.”). A “disinterested person” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)
(2006) as:
a person that—(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
(B) is not and was not, within 2 years before the date of the filing of the
petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor; and (C) does not have an
interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of
creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect
relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor, or for any other
reason.
Id.
157. Harner, supra note 155, at 473, 475 (noting that intercreditor conflict in bankruptcy
can erode the value of the estate and discussing a role for a third-party neutral who could
ameliorate much of the conflict and assist the bankruptcy court).
158. See supra Subsection I.A.3.
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it does not tip the scales dramatically in favor of any one party.159
Nevertheless, policymakers should craft carefully the legislation
implementing the standstill period and tailor it to serve the objectives of
the process while preserving all parties’ rights if the process fails.
For example, if the company qualifies for an MCP, the initial
standstill could last sixty days, with a possible thirty-day extension.160
During the standstill period, creditors would be enjoined from pursuit of
their collection rights against the company.161 The company in turn
would be permitted to pay only ordinary course business expenses and
would be required to stay current on those expenses, as well as any
interest or other current obligations under its funded debt (absent an
agreement to the contrary with the affected creditors). Notably, these
standards would require a company to invoke an MCP prior to any
liquidity crises or major defaults on funded debt.
4. The MCO Exit Plan
The MCP would have no required or preconceived exit strategy.
Although most companies could invoke the process to work towards a
restructuring plan that resolves its distress, that plan might not
159. In France:
[s]afeguard proceedings are aimed at improving the chances of survival of a
company facing difficulties by anticipating the situation at an early stage and
seeking to negotiate a safeguard plan with its creditors to ensure the
continuation of the company’s business, to maintain employment and to
restructure the company’s indebtedness . . . . Safeguard proceedings can only
be initiated by a debtor company if it is solvent and demonstrates that it is
encountering difficulties that it is not able to overcome.
Rod Cork & Marc Santoni, France: Restructuring and Insolvency Procedures, INT’L FIN. L.
REV. (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.iflr.com/Article/2166556/France-Restructuring-andinsolvency-procedures.html.
160. The process also could contemplate longer extensions with the consensus of a
majority or supermajority of the parties identified in the MC Notice. Notably, a voluntary
standstill agreement between a debtor and its creditors is a central feature of many out-of-court
restructuring approaches, which include the London Approach and the related INSOL Principles
that the INSOL Lenders Group developed. See Esteban C. Buljevich, The Workout Decalogue:
The New Global Approach to Debt Restructurings, in CROSS-BORDER DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS:
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES FOR CREDITORS, CORPORATES AND SOVEREIGNS 1, 8, 15 (2005),
available at http://www.euromoneyooks.com/images/covers/Cross-Border%20Debt%20
Restructurings%20Innovative%20Approaches%20for%20Creditors%20Corporates%20and%
20Sovereigns/Debt%20ch1.pdf. In addition, some countries seek to facilitate similar out-ofcourt workouts through legislation. See id. at 11–12.
161. The MCP statute would need to preserve the status quo among the company and its
creditors during the standstill period. Accordingly, the statute would need to toll any applicable
deadlines that relate to creditors’ enforcement rights. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2006) (tolling certain
claims against debtors, so long as the original period to file the claim against the debtor has not
expired before the debtor files its bankruptcy petition).
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materialize through the process or it might take any number of forms or
may not materialize through the process. If a plan emerges that
incorporates aspects of the Bankruptcy Code, such as a sale of assets, a
debt-for-equity exchange that eliminates existing equity holders, or the
rejection of contracts or leases, the company could commence a
streamlined formal bankruptcy case upon the conclusion of the MCP to
solicit acceptances and confirmation of the plan.162 If a plan can be
accomplished consensually and without the need for court approval, the
company could simply dismiss the MC Notice and proceed to
implement the plan outside of any formal case.163
Likewise, if a company completes the MCP and no plan emerges,
the company could dismiss the MC Notice and try to continue
operations and restructuring discussions without any formal bankruptcy
case. Alternatively, if the company wanted to commence a formal,
traditional case under either Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, it
could do so. The statute could recognize or reward the company’s
proactive efforts in the MCP if it provides special treatment for MCP
debtors. For example, the MCP debtor could receive a longer exclusive
period to file and solicit acceptances of its plan; it could receive
additional time to elect to assume or reject contracts and leases
(including commercial leases); and it could receive the benefit of
streamlined disclosures (particularly if the facilitator remains in the case
and files status reports with the court).164
The exit elements of the MCP would prove important to counter
several of the heuristics this Article discusses above.165 The
contemplated structure would allow directors and managers to test the
bankruptcy process in several respects without incurring significant
costs, facing intense public scrutiny, or losing control of the company’s
alternatives if the MCP fails.166 The short duration of the initial
standstill period and the involvement of multiple parties, which include

162. See, e.g., id. § 363(b)(1) (permitting the trustee to sell, use, or lease property of the
estate, when not in the ordinary course of business, but only after notice and a hearing); id.
§ 365(a) (permitting the trustee to assume or reject an executory contract or expired lease of the
debtor subject to the courts’ approval); id. § 1126 (discussing plan acceptance for parties whose
claim the plan impairs).
163. See supra Subsection I.A.1.
164. Several sections of the Code may need modification to accommodate special MCP
treatment. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (limiting the period during which the debtor can
reject an unexpired commercial lease to 120 days, with the ability to extend the period for a
maximum of 90 days for cause); id. § 1121 (specifying time periods for the debtor, exclusively,
to file and solicit votes on a plan and also limiting the opportunity to extend that period).
165. See supra Section I.B.
166. See supra Section I.B.
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a disinterested facilitator, would mitigate abusive or wrongful conduct
by the company’s directors and managers.167
5. The Potential Benefits
Several respondents in the Management Behavior Study discuss the
“extreme” nature of a bankruptcy filing and the potential unknown or
unintended consequences. As one respondent explains, clients resist
bankruptcy alternatives because it is the “most extreme option; it leaves
interim solutions out.”168 The MCP creates a quasi-bankruptcy or hybrid
restructuring alternative that addresses these and other issues and fosters
discussion of bankruptcy options as something other than a last
resort.169
The requirements to invoke the MCP and the standstill period
encourage companies and professionals to discuss the option before the
company’s distress becomes too severe.170 A company in default or a
defensive posture with its creditors likely will not qualify for the
process. The MCP recognizes the value in addressing distress when
there is still a viable company to restructure and rewards management
who adopt this proactive strategy.
Moreover, although a quasi-bankruptcy process, the MCP statute
would neither designate as a “debtor” the company that invoked an
MCP nor subject it to a bankruptcy case. This distinction might be
meaningless to some, but incredibly important to others. Specifically,
the non-bankruptcy nature of the MCP itself, the minimal (if any)
disruption of operations, and the elimination of the noise typically
associated with the first days of a bankruptcy case could be significant
differences for many. In this context, an MCP may reduce significantly
the representative issues and related heuristics that might impede an
executive’s decisions with respect to a traditional bankruptcy case.171

167. See infra Subsection III.B.6.
168. Response to Management Behavior Study (on file with authors).
169. “According to the World Bank Principles, an effective [restructuring] system should
include, ‘Laws and procedures that flexibly accommodate a broad range of restructuring
activities’ . . . . [and] should be flexible enough to allow the use by creditors and debtors of a
wide array of restructuring techniques.” GARRIDO, supra note 56, at 20. Moreover, the MCP
would result in less reputational damages and carry less stigma than a formal process. See id. at
10.
170. See supra Subsections III.B.2–3.
171. See supra Section I.B.
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6. The Potential Challenges
The MCP tries to strike an appropriate balance among the competing
interests of a distressed company and all of its constituencies; the
different types and causes of distress; and the authority and
accountability of the distressed company’s management. The balance is
delicate and likely subject to criticism. For example, some creditors
may believe that the standstill is too long or onerous.172 Others may
argue against the company’s role as the only party that can initiate the
MCP or an exit strategy.173 Still others may seek to eliminate the
proposed advantages to an MCP debtor in a subsequent Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 case.174
This Article addresses each of these and other potential issues in the
outline of the proposal above, and they are fair points worthy of
consideration.175 As with any proposal, the devil would be in the details
of the MCP statute, and the drafters would need to carefully evaluate
these issues when they draft the qualification standards and the
standstill parameters. In addition, the statute would need to include
provisions that address abuses of the process by either the distressed
company or stakeholders and the consequences of such conduct. The
MCP discussion in this Article is a framework to guide deliberations of
the competing considerations and help develop an appropriate hybrid
restructuring process. The end goal should be to devise a structure that
highlights the potential utility of a bankruptcy or quasi-bankruptcy
process and engenders a positive or gain frame perception among
professionals and business executives.176
CONCLUSION
The data this Article presents confirm what many commentators and
practitioners
long
expected—management
typically
resists
consideration of a bankruptcy case until it is arguably too late to use that
restructuring tool effectively. This finding is particularly relevant in the
current environment where an increasing number of distressed
companies appear to file bankruptcy cases only to sell their assets or
liquidate. These companies generally do not use bankruptcy to
reorganize their businesses. The attendant loss of jobs and revenue is
striking.
This Article and the Management Behavior Study offer the first
empirical glimpse into a potential contributing factor to this trend—
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra Subsection III.B.3.
See supra Subsections III.B.2, III.B.4.
See supra Subsection III.B.4.
See supra Subsections III.B.2–4.
See supra Subsections I.B.2, III.B.1; see also Kahneman, supra note 83, at 1456.
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management heuristics, cognitive biases, and loss framing. The study
shows a prevalent description of bankruptcy as an “option of last
resort.” This approach may enable risk-seeking conduct by
management, a behavioral tendency to which management may be
predisposed given studies that suggest management’s susceptibility to
confirmation and over-confidence biases. As one respondent to the
Management Behavior Study explains, management possesses
“[u]nfounded optimism that [it] could handle turnaround without
benefits of” the Bankruptcy Code.177
The meet and confer process this Article describes is designed to
counter several of these heuristics and encourage more thoughtful
discussions of the role of bankruptcy or quasi-bankruptcy tools in
restructuring negotiations.178 The MCP allows management control over
the timing and exit strategy that the process develops, but promotes
more timely consideration of the company’s distress through the
qualification standards and standstill parameters that the process
integrates. It further strikes a delicate balance between the requisite
incentives that foster management engagement and the requisite
protections that preserve creditors’ rights throughout the process. At its
core, the MCP strives to help management recognize distress for what it
might be—an opportunity to facilitate a successful failure.179

177. Response to Management Behavior Study (on file with authors).
178. See supra Sections I.B., III.B.
179. See, e.g., Sergio Marchionne, CEO, Chrysler Group LLC, A Year of Transformation,
Address at the NADA/IHS Global Insight Automotive Forum (Mar. 30, 2010) (video recording
available at http://blog.chryslerllc.com/blog.do?p=day&ds=30032010) (“The presentation of our
plan in November last year was entitled ‘From Chapter 11 to Chapter 1,’ as it represents a new
beginning for Chrysler. It is our road map for creative reconstruction.”).
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